Maroš Servátka

Dr. Maroš Servátka


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2019 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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Journal Article
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MLMatej Lorko
Matej Lorko
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka
LZLe Zhang
Le Zhang

14 March 2010 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka
RVRadovan Vadovič
Radovan Vadovič
This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on an empirical puzzle observed by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (Games and Economic Behavior 30:163-182, 2000) that the size of the foregone outside option by the first mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in a lost wallet game. Our conjecture was that the original protocol may not have made the size of the forgone outside option salient to second movers. Therefore, we change two features of the Dufwen- berg and Gneezy protocol: (i) instead of the strategy method we implement a direct response method (sequential play) for the decision of the second mover; and (ii) we use paper money certificates that are passed between the subjects rather than having subjects write down numbers representing their decisions. We observe that our procedure yields qualitatively the same result as the Dufwenberg and Gneezy experiment, i.e., the second movers do not respond to the change in the outside option of the first movers.

1 December 2013 in Experimental Economics
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CDCary Deck
Cary Deck
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka
STSteven Tucker
Steven Tucker
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goal of this paper was to examine messages under a double-blind payoff procedure to test the alternative explanation that promise keeping is due to external influence and reputational concerns. Employing a 2 × 2 design, we find no evidence that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff procedures. Further, the payoff procedure does not appear to impact aggregate cooperation.

1 October 2016 in Journal of Economic Psychology
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Journal Article
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DWDaniel Woods
Daniel Woods
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka

30 January 2018 in Experimental Economics
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DWDaniel Woods
Daniel Woods
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka
Reciprocity has been shown to be sensitive to perceived intentions, however, not much is known about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise nature of those intentions. For example, a person can strategically appear to be kind while being self-serving or can be selflessly (genuinely) kind. Do these two intentions elicit different reciprocal reactions? We propose a conjecture that self-serving but generous actions diminish the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless generous actions. We classify actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff, but by less than the giver’s maximum payoff, as being self-serving generous actions, while classifying actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff by more than the giver’s as selfless generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous actions are considered more generous than self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving generous actions will therefore result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this conjecture using two novel experimental designs. We find some evidence that subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, but no empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished reciprocal response.

30 April 2019 in Economic Inquiry
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Journal Article
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AAAndrej Angelovski
Andrej Angelovski
TNTibor Neugebauer
Tibor Neugebauer
MSMaroš Servátka
Maroš Servátka
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. (JELC91, H41)