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Mr. Sani Majumder
Research or Laboratory Scientist

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0 Collaboration
0 Supply Chain
0 Green Supply Chain Management
0 Stackelberg game theory
0 Inventory,

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Journal article
Published: 08 December 2020 in Sustainability
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This study explores the optimal pricing and investment decision for two competing green supply chains, both consisting of a manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. Our focus is to explore, does the strategic integration decision with rivals at the horizontal level or with partners at the vertical level have any effect on green product types? The results reveal the following insights: retailer-retailer strategic integration at downstream level leads to a sub-optimal total supply chain profit and green quality level for a development-intensive green product. Two competing manufacturers can produce products at a higher level if they are vertically integrated with respective retailers. Manufacturer-manufacturer integration at upstream level sometimes leads to higher profits and product quality level if cross price-elasticity of consumers is high. However, an opposite phenomenon is observed while they are selling for a marginal-intensive green product, horizontal integration can improve green quality levels, but supply chain members will receive a lower profit. Therefore, selection of green product types and strategic integration decision are interrelated to achieve the profit maximization goal along with the aim to offer products at a higher green quality level. Vertical integration strategy can outperform horizontal integration strategy, especially if cross-price elastic for green products remain high.

ACS Style

Izabela Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Eryk Szwarc; Subrata Saha. Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing. Sustainability 2020, 12, 10248 .

AMA Style

Izabela Nielsen, Sani Majumder, Eryk Szwarc, Subrata Saha. Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (24):10248.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Izabela Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Eryk Szwarc; Subrata Saha. 2020. "Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing." Sustainability 12, no. 24: 10248.

Conference paper
Published: 01 February 2020 in Econometrics for Financial Applications
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This study analyzes the influence of power structure on pricing, greening decisions, and profits of the channel members in a decentralized supply chain. In order to identify the characteristics of the optimal greening level and the profits of the supply chain members, three different models are developed and analyzed under manufacturer-Stackelberg, retailer-Stackelberg, and vertical Nash game settings. Results from the present study suggest that both the retailer and manufacturer prefers their respective leaderships. But the sales volume is higher in Nash game structure. However, consumer gets more benefits under the retailers’ leadership.

ACS Style

Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha; Kartick Dey. Green Manufacturing in a Decentralized Supply Chain. Econometrics for Financial Applications 2020, 549 -556.

AMA Style

Sani Majumder, Subrata Saha, Kartick Dey. Green Manufacturing in a Decentralized Supply Chain. Econometrics for Financial Applications. 2020; ():549-556.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha; Kartick Dey. 2020. "Green Manufacturing in a Decentralized Supply Chain." Econometrics for Financial Applications , no. : 549-556.

Journal article
Published: 23 December 2019 in Applied Sciences
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The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

ACS Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha. Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision. Applied Sciences 2019, 10, 145 .

AMA Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen, Sani Majumder, Subrata Saha. Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision. Applied Sciences. 2019; 10 (1):145.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha. 2019. "Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision." Applied Sciences 10, no. 1: 145.

Journal article
Published: 19 November 2019 in IEEE Access
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ACS Style

Subrata Saha; Sani Majumder; Izabela Ewa Nielsen. Is It a Strategic Move to Subsidized Consumers Instead of the Manufacturer? IEEE Access 2019, 7, 169807 -169824.

AMA Style

Subrata Saha, Sani Majumder, Izabela Ewa Nielsen. Is It a Strategic Move to Subsidized Consumers Instead of the Manufacturer? IEEE Access. 2019; 7 ():169807-169824.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Subrata Saha; Sani Majumder; Izabela Ewa Nielsen. 2019. "Is It a Strategic Move to Subsidized Consumers Instead of the Manufacturer?" IEEE Access 7, no. : 169807-169824.

Original research
Published: 16 November 2019 in Journal of Industrial Engineering International
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The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits. Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening level.

ACS Style

Subrata Saha; Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder. Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives. Journal of Industrial Engineering International 2019, 15, 291 -308.

AMA Style

Subrata Saha, Izabela Ewa Nielsen, Sani Majumder. Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives. Journal of Industrial Engineering International. 2019; 15 (S1):291-308.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Subrata Saha; Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder. 2019. "Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives." Journal of Industrial Engineering International 15, no. S1: 291-308.

Journal article
Published: 04 July 2019 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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The Government organizations provide incentives to the manufacturers for adopting green technologies in different ways. The objective of this study is to generate a decision support framework in perspectives of the selection and successful implementation towards environment-friendly products by comparing profits of each member, greening level, consumer surplus and environmental improvement under two different incentive policies. Twelve analytical models are formulated and analyzed by considering the impact of two game structures, single and two-period procurement decisions on the sustainability goals of supply chain members. The objectives of government's social welfare are optimized here. A comprehensive analysis reveals that the manufacturer receives higher profits and the greening level is always at higher end in two-period procurement decision under manufacturer-Stackelberg game. The greening level and profit of the retailer are maximum in single-period procurement decision under retailer-Stackelberg game. As a result, optimal preference is highly sensitive to game structure and procurement decision. When the manufacturer sets a premeditated threshold for greening level, supply chain members receive higher profits under incentive policy on per-unit product because of lower sales price, higher consumer surplus and environmental improvement compared to government incentive policy on total investment in R&D. The greening level is maximum under incentive policy on total investment in R&D that results in higher environmental improvement. Supply chain members can compromise with their sustainable goals to receive higher profits in presence of incentives.

ACS Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Shib Sankar Sana; Subrata Saha. Comparative analysis of government incentives and game structures on single and two-period green supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production 2019, 235, 1371 -1398.

AMA Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen, Sani Majumder, Shib Sankar Sana, Subrata Saha. Comparative analysis of government incentives and game structures on single and two-period green supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2019; 235 ():1371-1398.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Shib Sankar Sana; Subrata Saha. 2019. "Comparative analysis of government incentives and game structures on single and two-period green supply chain." Journal of Cleaner Production 235, no. : 1371-1398.

Journal article
Published: 13 June 2019 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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In many countries, the contribution of unorganized or micro-retailers to the overall economy and sustainability is a topic of increasing importance. Although these retailers are commonly dependent on the intermediaries for trading, there is scarce literature addressing the influence of intermediaries in green supply chain practice. This study explores the repercussions of a dominant intermediary in a three-echelon green supply chain under price and greening level sensitive demand in both single and two-period setting. The results demonstrates that the manufacturer is able to sell maximum amount of products and the retailer receives higher profits if an intermediary dominates the market. A dominant intermediary can urge the manufacturer to promote products with a lower greening level. In such scenario, the unit R&D investment in producing green products is less, but each participant may receive higher profits. A sequential profit-sharing mechanism is proposed from the perspective of the manufacturer that can be employed under leadership of the wholesaler. Under this mechanism, the retailer can maintain strategic inventory, each member can receive higher profits, and most importantly, the manufacturer can promote products at highest greening level to achieve sustainability goals. If consumer takes into account the GL-price ratio, then two-period procurement planning always outperforms single period optimal decision under manufacturer-Stackelberg game. The insights can assist manufacturers to create a foundation for sustainable business practices.

ACS Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha. Exploring the intervention of intermediary in a green supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production 2019, 233, 1525 -1544.

AMA Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen, Sani Majumder, Subrata Saha. Exploring the intervention of intermediary in a green supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2019; 233 ():1525-1544.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Izabela Ewa Nielsen; Sani Majumder; Subrata Saha. 2019. "Exploring the intervention of intermediary in a green supply chain." Journal of Cleaner Production 233, no. : 1525-1544.