Differential Privacy (DP) has received increasing attention as a rigorous privacy framework. Many existing studies employ traditional DP mechanisms (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) as primitives to continuously release private data for protecting privacy at each time point (i.e., event-level privacy), which assume that the data at different time points are independent, or that adversaries do not have knowledge of correlation between data. However, continuously generated data tend to be temporally correlated, and such correlations can be acquired by adversaries. In this paper, we investigate the potential privacy loss of a traditional DP mechanism under temporal correlations. First, we analyze the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism under temporal correlation that can be modeled using Markov Chain. Our analysis reveals that, the event-level privacy loss of a DP mechanism may increase over time. We call the unexpected privacy loss temporal privacy leakage (TPL). Although TPL may increase over time, we find that its supremum may exist in some cases. Second, we design efficient algorithms for calculating TPL. Third, we propose data releasing mechanisms that convert any existing DP mechanism into one against TPL. Experiments confirm that our approach is efficient and effective.

Differential Privacy (DP) has received increasing attention as a rigorous privacy framework. Many existing studies employ traditional DP mechanisms (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) as primitives, which assume that the data are independent, or that adversaries do not have knowledge of the data correlations. However, continuous generated data in the real world tend to be temporally correlated, and such correlations can be acquired by adversaries. In this paper, we investigate the potential privacy loss of a traditional DP mechanism under temporal correlations in the context of continuous data release. First, we model the temporal correlations using Markov model and analyze the privacy leakage of a DP mechanism when adversaries have knowledge of such temporal correlations. Our analysis reveals that the privacy loss of a DP mechanism may accumulate and increase over time. We call it temporal privacy leakage. Second, to measure such privacy loss, we design an efficient algorithm for calculating it in polynomial time. Although the temporal privacy leakage may increase over time, we also show that its supremum may exist in some cases. Third, to bound the privacy loss, we propose mechanisms that convert any existing DP mechanism into one against temporal privacy leakage. Experiments with synthetic data confirm that our approach is efficient and effective.

In recent years, privacy and security concerns in machine learning have promoted trusted federated learning to the forefront of research. Differential privacy has emerged as the de facto standard for privacy protection in federated learning due to its rigorous mathematical foundation and provable guarantee. Despite extensive research on algorithms that incorporate differential privacy within federated learning, there remains an evident deficiency in systematic reviews that categorize and synthesize these studies. Our work presents a systematic overview of the differentially private federated learning. Existing taxonomies have not adequately considered objects and level of privacy protection provided by various differential privacy models in federated learning. To rectify this gap, we propose a new taxonomy of differentially private federated learning based on definition and guarantee of various differential privacy models and federated scenarios. Our classification allows for a clear delineation of the protected objects across various differential privacy models and their respective neighborhood levels within federated learning environments. Furthermore, we explore the applications of differential privacy in federated learning scenarios. Our work provide valuable insights into privacy-preserving federated learning and suggest practical directions for future research.

Location privacy-preserving mechanisms (LPPMs) have been extensively studied for protecting users' location privacy by releasing a perturbed location to third parties such as location-based service providers. However, when a user's perturbed locations are released continuously, existing LPPMs may not protect the sensitive information about the user's real-world activities, such as "visited hospital in the last week" or "regularly commuting between Address 1 and 2" (it is easy to infer that Addresses 1 and 2 may be home and office), which we call it spatiotemporal event. In this paper, we first formally define spatiotemporal event as Boolean expressions between location and time predicates, and then we define $\epsilon$ -spatiotemporal event privacy by extending the notion of differential privacy. Second, to understand how much spatiotemporal event privacy that existing LPPMs can provide, we design computationally efficient algorithms to quantify the privacy leakage of state-of-the-art LPPMs when an adversary has prior knowledge of the user's initial probability over possible locations. It turns out that the existing LPPMs cannot adequately protect spatiotemporal event privacy. Third, we propose a framework, PriSTE, to transform an existing LPPM into one protecting spatiotemporal event privacy against adversaries with any prior knowledge. Our experiments on real-life and synthetic data verified that the proposed method is effective and efficient.

Mobility data captures the locations of moving objects such as humans, animals, and cars. With the availability of Global Positioning System (GPS)–equipped mobile devices and other inexpensive location-tracking technologies, mobility data is collected ubiquitously. In recent years, the use of mobility data has demonstrated a significant impact in various domains, including traffic management, urban planning, and health sciences. In this article, we present the domain of mobility data science. Towards a unified approach to mobility data science, we present a pipeline having the following components: mobility data collection, cleaning, analysis, management, and privacy. For each of these components, we explain how mobility data science differs from general data science, we survey the current state-of-the-art, and describe open challenges for the research community in the coming years.