This paper first portrays the equilibrium payoff of enterprise’s cooperation of environmental governance based on the Cournot model. Secondly, the evolutionary game model in complex networks is adopted to depict the evolution of environmental governance cooperative behavior among enterprises. Further, the evolutionary process of environmental governance cooperative behavior of enterprises is simulated considering the supervision behavior of government and the reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization. The results show that the cooperation level of enterprise group under self-organization condition will reach a low level; the supervision of government can enhance the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation while it has limited effect on enterprise group with low betrayal tempatation. The reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization can realize reputation effect to improve the the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation. The enhance of reputation sensitivity can optimize equilibrium distribution of reputation and it can strengthen the reputation effect on cooperation level. Based on the analysis above, the suggestions to effectively improve cooperation level are given.
This study proposes an innovative hypergraph model to explore the effects of higher-order interactions on the evolution of cooperative behavior in a hyperbolic scale-free network. By adjusting the heterogeneity coefficient and clustering coefficient of the hyperbolic scale-free network, four distinct network structures with notable differences can be obtained. We then map pairwise and three-way interactions to 2-hyperedges and 3-hyperedges, constructing a hypergraph model with higher-order interactions. Our findings reveal that when the proportion of three-way interactions exceeds a critical threshold, cooperative tendencies exhibit explosive growth, leading to a bistable phenomenon of coexisting cooperation and defection. The system's average degree significantly influences the critical mass of initial cooperators needed to maintain stable cooperative behavior. The network structure shows complex, non-linear effects on cooperation. In low-conditions, increasing heterogeneity acts to suppress the appearance of bistable phenomena, while in high clustering conditions, it acts to promote. Increasing clustering tends to suppress the appearance of bistable phenomena in both low and high heterogeneity conditions. Furthermore, the effects of heterogeneity, clustering, and noise factors on cooperation are non-monotonic, exhibiting inverted U-shaped patterns with critical transition points. These findings provide new theoretical perspectives for understanding diverse cooperation patterns in real-world scenarios and suggest the need for dynamic, context-specific approaches when designing strategies to promote cooperation.