Ruguo Fan

Dr. Ruguo Fan

Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 October 2022 in Journal of Environmental Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YWYuanyuan Wang
Yuanyuan Wang
RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan
JLJinchai Lin
Jinchai Lin
FCFangze Chen
Fangze Chen
RQRourou Qian
Rourou Qian

RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan
YWYibo Wang
Yibo Wang
JLJinchai Lin
Jinchai Lin
In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

25 March 2023 in Applied Soft Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KDKang Du
Kang Du
RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan
YWYuanyuan Wang
Yuanyuan Wang
DWDongxue Wang
Dongxue Wang
RQRourou Qian
Rourou Qian
BZBingqing Zhu
Bingqing Zhu

16 August 2023 in Expert Systems with Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KDKang Du
Kang Du
RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan

LMLuo Ming
Luo Ming
RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan
ZYZHANG Yingqing
ZHANG Yingqing
CZChaoping Zhu
Chaoping Zhu
This paper first portrays the equilibrium payoff of enterprise’s cooperation of environmental governance based on the Cournot model. Secondly, the evolutionary game model in complex networks is adopted to depict the evolution of environmental governance cooperative behavior among enterprises. Further, the evolutionary process of environmental governance cooperative behavior of enterprises is simulated considering the supervision behavior of government and the reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization. The results show that the cooperation level of enterprise group under self-organization condition will reach a low level; the supervision of government can enhance the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation while it has limited effect on enterprise group with low betrayal tempatation. The reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization can realize reputation effect to improve the the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation. The enhance of reputation sensitivity can optimize equilibrium distribution of reputation and it can strengthen the reputation effect on cooperation level. Based on the analysis above, the suggestions to effectively improve cooperation level are given.

23 September 2023 in Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KDKang Du
Kang Du
RFRuguo Fan
Ruguo Fan
YWYuanyuan Wang
Yuanyuan Wang
DWDongxue Wang
Dongxue Wang