This paper considers the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that are Pareto optimal with respect to the rest Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The sufficient conditions for the existence of such pure strategy profiles are established. These conditions employ the Germeier convolutions of the payoff functions. For the non-cooperative games with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions, the existence of the Pareto optimal Nash equilibria in mixed strategies is proved.
The Berge equilibrium concept was suggested by Russian mathematician K. Vaisman in 1994. In this paper, we suggest to use this concept as a mathematical model of the Golden Rule. The Berge–Pareto equilibrium is formalized and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are found. As a supplement, the existence of the mixed strategy equilibrium is proved.
1 June 2019 in Vestnik Udmurtskogo Universiteta. Matematika. Mekhanika. Komp'yuternye Nauki
In this article, we suggest a new concept of an optimal solution in 3-person game, that we call “coalitional equilibrium”. This equilibrium based on the concepts of Nash and Berge equilibria obtained. We apply the concept of an optimal solution that cannot increase the outcome of a deviant coalition. Then we determine sufficient conditions of existence of a coalitional equilibrium using the Germeier resultant. These conditions can be reduced to building a saddle point in a special antagonistic game that can be effectively constructed on the mathematical model of the original game.