The Berge equilibrium concept was suggested by Russian mathematician K. Vaisman in 1994. In this paper, we suggest to use this concept as a mathematical model of the Golden Rule. The Berge–Pareto equilibrium is formalized and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are found. As a supplement, the existence of the mixed strategy equilibrium is proved.
The linear-quadratic differential noncooperative positional game with a small influence of one player on the rate of change of the state vector is considered. The coefficient criteria for the existence of Berge and Nash equilibria are established and a design procedure for such equilibria is suggested, on the basis of dynamic programming combined with the small parameter method.
This paper develops the methodology for modeling decision processes in complex controlled dynamic systems. The idea of balancing such systems (driving them to equilibrium) is implemented, and a new mechanism for the equilibria’s stability is proposed. Such an approach involves economic–mathematical modeling jointly with systems analysis methods, economics, law, sociology, game theory, management, and performance measurement. A linear-quadratic positional differential game of several players is considered. Coefficient criteria under which the game has an equilibrium in sanctions and countersanctions and, simultaneously, no Nash equilibrium are derived. The economic and legal model of active equilibrium is studied through the legal concept of sanctions, which enlarges the practical application of this class of problems.
This paper extends the earlier research of the Golden Rule in the static case [2] to the dynamic one. The main idea is to use the Germeier convolution of the payoff functions of players within the...
The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.