In this paper, a novel class of power analysis attacks to cryptographic circuits is presented. These attacks aim at recovering the secret key of a cryptographic core from measurements of its static (leakage) power. These attacks exploit the dependence of the leakage current of CMOS integrated circuits on their inputs (including the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm that they implement), as opposite to traditional power analysis attacks that are focused on the dynamic power. For this reason, this novel class of attacks is named ¿leakage power analysis¿ (LPA). Since the leakage power increases much faster than the dynamic power at each new technology generation, LPA attacks are a serious threat to the information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100-nm technologies. For the first time in the literature, a well-defined procedure to perform LPA attacks that is based on a solid theoretical background is presented. Advantages and measurement issues are also analyzed in comparison with traditional power analysis attacks based on dynamic power measurements. Examples are provided for various circuits, and an experimental attack to a register is performed for the first time. An analytical model of the LPA attack result is also provided to better understand the effectiveness of this technique. The impact of technology scaling is explicitly addressed by means of a simple analytical model and Monte Carlo simulations. Simulations on a 65- and 90-nm technology and experimental results are presented to justify the assumptions and validate the leakage power models that are adopted.

In this brief we present a novel, ultra-compact, True Random Number Generator (TRNG) architecture and its FPGA implementation. The proposed Latched Ring Oscillator (LRO) TRNG allows the generation of a TRNG bit from a single FPGA Slice. Despite its very compact structure, the proposed LRO-TRNG relies on both meta-stability and accumulated jitter as entropy sources, and exhibits very good results in terms of unpredictability and randomness. The proposed architecture has been implemented on Xilinx Spartan-6 devices and the TRNG performances have been extensively validated under supply voltage and temperature variations. Measurements results have shown that the LRO-TRNG exhibits an estimated entropy of about 7.99834 per bit (according to T8 test of the AIS-31) and a throughput of 0.76 Mbits/s with a 50MHz clock. A comparison against the state of the art shows that the proposed LRO-TRNG outperforms most of the previously published TRNGs, in terms of the ratio between throughput and FPGA resources usage.

This paper presents a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) exploiting latched-XOR (LX) gates and its implementation on a Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA device. The proposed LX-TRNG aims at improving the Throughput (TP) of conventional ring oscillators (ROs) based TRNGs by combining the effect of latches metastability and ROs jitter. Measurements results have demonstrated that the generated bitstreams show very good randomness exhibiting a byte (bit) entropy of 7.9979 (0.9997), according to T8-test of AIS-31. The proposed TRNG has also been extensively tested under voltage and temperature variations showing very good robustness. In particular both NIST’s and AIS-31 tests are passed for all the considered supply voltage and temperature ranges. The FPGA implementation occupies only 9 Slices and, despite its compactness, it exhibits a throughput as high as 12.5 Mbit/s with a 50 MHz operating frequency. The computation of the figure of merit $FOM_E$ has shown the capability of the proposed TRNG to optimize the trade-off between hardware resources, bitstreams entropy and throughput, outperforming previous works.

This paper extends the analysis of the effectiveness of Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attacks to cryptographic VLSI circuits on which circuit level countermeasures against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) are adopted. Security metrics used for assessing the DPA-resistance of crypto core implementations, such as the minimum number to disclosure (MTD) and the asymptotic correlation coefficient, have been extended to the case of LPA. The LPA-resistance has been evaluated in terms of MTD as a function of the on chip noise. Noise variances up to 10000 times greater than the signal variance have been taken into account and LPA attacks have been successfully executed for all the logic styles under analysis using less than 100000 measurements. Moreover the role of process variations has been investigated through extensive Monte Carlo simulations in order to evaluate their impact on the leakage model for the logic styles under analysis. Results show that LPA attacks can be successfully carried out on the different anti-DPA logic styles even in presence of process variations. To the best of our knowledge, this work proves for the first time the effectiveness of LPA attacks in a real scenario where on chip noise and process variations are taken into account.

This paper presents a CMOS operational transconductance amplifier (OTA), suitable for sub-1-V supply applications, whose (input) common-mode voltage can be set to (V _DD + V _SS )/2 thanks to two combined techniques applied to the differential pair, namely, threshold voltage lowering and elimination of the tail current generator. Both techniques are implemented through a single common-mode feedback loop, which embeds the shared bulk terminal of the pair. In contrast to other low-voltage approaches employing bulk driving, the proposed OTA is driven from the gate terminals and exploits only MOS transistors in strong inversion. Therefore, effective values of dc gain, gain bandwidth, and noise are found, suitable for high-accuracy switched-capacitor applications. Using a standard 0.35-μm technology with nominal MOS transistors threshold around 0.7 V, a 0.9-V OTA with 0.45-V analog ground was designed and successfully tested. The measured gain and unity gain frequency were 65 dB and 1 MHz with phase margin of 60° for a capacitive load of 10 pF.