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Mr. Liang Ma
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University

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0 Distributed Control System (DCS)
0 microgrid
0 Cyber physical system
0 power system
0 resilient control

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Journal article
Published: 25 July 2020 in Energies
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This paper addresses the problem of voltage and reactive power control of inverter-based distributed generations (DGs) in an islanded microgrid subject to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks. To implement average voltage restoration and reactive power sharing, a two-layer distributed secondary control framework employing a multiagent system (MAS)-based dynamic consensus protocol is proposed. While communication network facilitates distributed control scheme, it leads to vulnerability of microgrids to malicious cyber-attacks. The adverse effects of FDI attack on the secondary controller are analyzed, and the necessary and sufficient conditions to model stealthy attack and probing attack are discussed in detail. A trust-based resilient control strategy is developed to resist the impacts of FDI attack. Based on the forward-backward consistency criterion, the self-monitoring and neighbor-monitoring mechanisms are developed to detect the misbehaving DGs. A group decision-making mechanism is also introduced to settle conflicts arising from the dishonest trust index caused by colluding attacks. A novel mitigation countermeasure is designed to eliminate the adversarial effects of attack: the discarding information mechanism is used to prevent the propagation of false data in the cooperative network while the recovery actions are designed to correct the deviations of collective estimation error in both transient disturbance and continuous FDI attack scenarios. Through a theoretical analysis, it is proved that the proposed mitigation and recovery mechanism can maintain the correct average estimates of voltage and reactive power, which ensures the secondary control objectives of microgrids under FDI attack. Simulation results on an islanded microgrid show the effectiveness and resilience of the proposed control scheme.

ACS Style

Liang Ma; Gang Xu. Distributed Resilient Voltage and Reactive Power Control for Islanded Microgrids under False Data Injection Attacks. Energies 2020, 13, 3828 .

AMA Style

Liang Ma, Gang Xu. Distributed Resilient Voltage and Reactive Power Control for Islanded Microgrids under False Data Injection Attacks. Energies. 2020; 13 (15):3828.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Liang Ma; Gang Xu. 2020. "Distributed Resilient Voltage and Reactive Power Control for Islanded Microgrids under False Data Injection Attacks." Energies 13, no. 15: 3828.

Journal article
Published: 29 May 2020 in Applied Sciences
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This paper addresses the problem of voltage restoration and reactive power sharing of inverter-based distributed generations (DGs) in an islanded microgrid subject to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Note that DoS attacks may block information exchange among DGs by jamming the communication network in the secondary control level of a microgrid. A two-layer distributed secondary control framework is presented, in which a state observer employing the multiagent system (MAS)-based ternary self-triggered control is implemented for discovering the average information of voltage and reactive power in a fully distributed manner while highly reducing communication burden than that the periodic communication way. The compensation for the reference signal to the primary control is acquired according to the average estimates to achieve voltage restoration while properly sharing reactive power among DGs. An improved ternary self-triggered control strategy integrating an acknowledgment (ACK)-based monitoring mechanism is established, where DoS attacks are modeled by repeated cycles of jamming and sleeping. A new triggering condition is developed to guarantee the successful information exchange between DGs when the sleep period of DoS attacks is detected. Using the Lyapunov approach, it is proved that the proposed algorithm allows agents to reach consensus regardless of the frequency of the DoS attacks, which maintains the accurate estimation of average information and the implementation of the secondary control objectives. The performance of the proposed control scheme is evaluated under simulation and experimental conditions. The results show that the proposed secondary control scheme can highly reduce the inter-agent communication as well as improve the robustness of the system to resist DoS attacks.

ACS Style

Gang Xu; Liang Ma. Resilient Self-Triggered Control for Voltage Restoration and Reactive Power Sharing in Islanded Microgrids under Denial-of-Service Attacks. Applied Sciences 2020, 10, 1 .

AMA Style

Gang Xu, Liang Ma. Resilient Self-Triggered Control for Voltage Restoration and Reactive Power Sharing in Islanded Microgrids under Denial-of-Service Attacks. Applied Sciences. 2020; 10 (11):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Gang Xu; Liang Ma. 2020. "Resilient Self-Triggered Control for Voltage Restoration and Reactive Power Sharing in Islanded Microgrids under Denial-of-Service Attacks." Applied Sciences 10, no. 11: 1.