This work proposes a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing detection and classification technique for single antenna receivers. We formulate an optimization problem at the baseband correlator domain by using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). We model correlator tap outputs of the received signal to form a dictionary of triangle-shaped functions and leverage sparse signal processing to choose a decomposition of shifted matching triangles from said dictionary. The optimal solution of this minimization problem discriminates the presence of a potential spoofing attack peak by observing a decomposition of two different code-phase values (authentic and spoofed) in a sparse vector output. We use a threshold to mitigate false alarms. Furthermore, we present a variation of the minimization problem by enhancing the dictionary to a higher-resolution of shifted triangles. The proposed technique can be implemented as an advanced fine-acquisition monitoring tool to aid in the tracking loops for spoofing mitigation. In our experiments, we are able to distinguish authentic and spoofer peaks from synthetic data simulations and from a real dataset, namely, the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT). The proposed method achieves 0.3% detection error rate (DER) for a spoofer attack in nominal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) conditions and an authentic-over-spoofer power of 3 dB.
4 October 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement
Recently, several global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) emerged following the transformative technology impact of the first GNSS--U.S. global positioning system (GPS). The power level of GNSS signals as measured at earth's surface is below the noise floor and is consequently vulnerable against interference. Spoofers are smart GNSS-like interferers, which mislead the receivers into generating false position and time information. While many spoofing mitigation techniques exist, spoofers are continually evolving, producing a cycle of new spoofing attacks and counter-measures against them. Thus, upgradability of receivers becomes an important advantage for maintaining their immunity against spoofing. Software-defined radio implementations of a GPS receiver address such flexibility but are challenged by demanding computational requirements of both GNSS signal processing and spoofing mitigation. Therefore, this paper reviews reported SDRs in the context of instrumentation capabilities for both conventional and spoofing mitigation modes. This separation is necessitated by significantly increased computational loads when in spoofing domain. This is demonstrated by a case study budget analysis.
This paper presents a novel time synchronization attack (TSA) model for the Global Positioning System (GPS) based on clock data behavior changes in a higher-order derivative domain. Further, TSA rejection and mitigation based on sparse domain (TSARM-S) is presented. TSAs affect stationary GPS receivers in applications where precise timing is required, such as cellular communications, financial transactions, and monitoring of the electric power grid. In the present work, higher-order derivatives of the clock bias and clock drift are monitored to reveal TSAs that show up as sparse spike-like events. The smoothness of the attack relates to the derivative order where the sparsity is observed. The proposed method jointly estimates a dynamic solution for GPS timing and rejects clock behavior changes based on such sparse events. An evaluation procedure is presented for two testbeds, namely a commercial receiver and a software-defined radio (SDR). Further, the proposed method is evaluated against real spoofing scenarios available online in the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT). Combined synthetic and real-data results show an average RMS clock bias error of 12.08 m for the SDR platform, and 45.74 m for the commercial device. Furthermore, the technique is evaluated against state-of-the-art mitigation techniques and in a spoofing-plus-multipath scenario for robustness. Finally, TSARM-S can be potentially optimized and implemented in commercial devices via a firmware upgrade.
19 April 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement
Indoor positioning systems exploiting wireless local area network (WLAN) signal measurements, such as received signal strength (RSS), are gaining popularity due to high accuracy of the results. Sets of RSS and other measurements at designated locations from available WLAN access points are conventionally called fingerprints and typically retrieved from network cards at a 1-Hz rate. Such measurement collection is needed for the offline radio map surveying stage which assigns fingerprints to locations, and for online navigation stage when collected measurements are associated with the radio map for positioning. As WLAN networks are not originally designed for localization, the network cards occasionally miss the fingerprints, measurement fluctuations necessitate statistical signal processing, and the surveying process is very time consuming. This paper describes a fast measurement collection approach that addresses the mentioned problems--higher probability of measurement acquisition, more data for statistical processing, and faster surveying. The approach is further analyzed for practical setting applications.
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers’ presence in inflicted signals’ derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver, and 2) a commercial hand-held device.