Briony Pulford

Prof. Briony Pulford

University of Leicester, UK
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

31Years (1996-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 July 1997 in Personality and Individual Differences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
Andrew ColmanAndrew Colman
Andrew Colman

1 June 2008 in Acta Psychologica
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Andrew ColmanAndrew Colman
Andrew Colman
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
JRJo Rose
Jo Rose

1 June 2009 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
The influences of optimism and pessimism on ambiguity aversion were investigated in two tasks that manipulated the presence or absence of a potentially competitive experimenter. A total of 112 participants chose which option—ambiguous or known-risk—they preferred in the two slightly differing Ellsberg urns tasks. Optimism was measured using the Extended Life Orientation Test (ELOT). Highly optimistic people showed significantly less ambiguity aversion than less optimistic people when information was given that the number of balls was randomly determined. This pattern was present but less pronounced in the condition when the composition of the ambiguous urn could be interpreted as being influenced (rigged) by the experimenter. Pessimism was uninfluential. Perceptions of the situation, especially the degree of trust in the experimenter, were significantly influenced by the participants’ optimism. People who do not have highly optimistic personalities tend to shy away from choosing ambiguous options. When ambiguity is clear, and trust issues are removed, people's optimistic outlook influences their degree of ambiguity aversion and thus their decisions.

1 April 2015 in Journal of Economic Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
NGNatalie Gold
Natalie Gold
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
Andrew ColmanAndrew Colman
Andrew Colman
Many people judge that it is permissible to harm one person in order to save many in some circumstances but not in others: it matters how the harm comes about. Researchers have used trolley problems to investigate this phenomenon, eliciting moral judgments or behavioral predictions about hypothetical scenarios where five people can be saved at the cost of harming one other person. We operationalized trolley problems in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, allowing us to observe not only judgments but actual decisions. We varied whether the five were saved by clicking a switch that diverted the harm to the one or by dragging the one in front of the harm. We found differences in moral judgments between the two tasks, but no differences in behavior. The judgments of actors and observers also differed, with observers judging it more right to act. Our results suggest that the difference between moral judgments and actions arises because participants think that doing the right action still involves doing something morally discreditable, and that the morality of taking action does not exhaust the normative reasons for acting

1 January 2014 in Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Andrew ColmanAndrew Colman
Andrew Colman
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
CLCatherine L. Lawrence
Catherine L. Lawrence
In common interest games, players generally manage to coordinate their actions on mutually optimal outcomes, but orthodox game theory provides no reason for them to play their individual parts in these seemingly obvious solutions and no justification for choosing the corresponding strategies. A number of theories have been suggested to explain coordination, among the most prominent being versions of cognitive hierarchy theory, theories of team reasoning, and social projection theory (in symmetric games). Each of these theories provides a plausible explanation but is theoretically problematic. An improved theory of strong Stackelberg reasoning avoids these problems and explains coordination among players who care about their co-players’ payoffs and who act as though their co-players can anticipate their choices. Two experiments designed to test cognitive hierarchy, team reasoning, and strong Stackelberg theories against one another in games without obvious, payoff-dominant solutions suggest that each of the theories provides part of the explanation. Cognitive hierarchy Level-1 reasoning, facilitated by a heuristic of avoiding the worst payoff, tended to predominate, especially in more complicated games, but strong Stackelberg reasoning occurred quite frequently in the simpler games and team reasoning in both the simpler and the more complicated games. Most players considered two or more of these reasoning processes before choosing their strategies.Peer-reviewedPost-prin

1 December 2006 in Personality and Individual Differences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Briony PulfordBriony Pulford
Briony Pulford
HSHarjit Sohal
Harjit Sohal