Francisco Javier Lopez Frias

Prof. Francisco Javier Lopez Frias

Assistant Professor in the Kinesiology Department and Research Associate in the Rock Ethics, Penn State
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
20 July 2020 in Journal of Leisure Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
John DattiloJohn Dattilo
John Dattilo
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
We provide a critical approach to current colloquial and scholarly understandings of leisure focusing on instrumental understandings of leisure in modern, liberal-democratic society since these instrumental understandings (e.g., diversion, distinction, consumerism, and restoration for work) create confusion about the meaning of leisure. We identify that (a) emphasis on instrumental thinking prevailing in modern society moves people away from embracing leisure as an end with its inherent experiences of meaning and flourishing, and (b) to bring these elements back into leisure, we draw on post-modern, neo-Aristotelian philosophical approaches. We reject the notion of leisure as time or activity and adopt a normative approach identifying leisure as an ethical state of being characterized by authenticity, meaning, and liquidity involving learning as it intertwines with positivity. We provide an account of leisure that builds upon the idea that the good life exists through flourishing, and identify how leisure experiences promote flourishing.

14 December 2016 in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
In this paper, I engage the debate on Suits’ theory of games by providing a Kantian view of Utopia. I argue that although the Kantian aspects of Suits’ approach are often overlooked in comparison to its Socratic-Platonic aspects, Kant’s ideas play a fundamental role in Suits’ proposal. In particular, Kant’s concept of ‘regulative idea’ is the basis of Suits’ Utopia. I regard Utopia as Suits’ regulative idea on game playing. In doing so, I take Utopia to play a double role in Suits’ theory of games. First, it highlights the primary condition of possibility of game-playing, namely, the lusory attitude. Second, it provides a normative criterion that serves as a critical principle to evaluate instances of game playing and as a counterfactual assumption that makes game playing possible. I provide further support for my Kantian interpretation of Suits’ Utopia by bringing to light the anthropological assumptions upon which Utopia is built. In doing so, I argue that both Suits’ theory of games, in general, and his Utopia, in particular, lay out the conditions of possibility of game playing, not an analysis on the life most worth living.

2 January 2016 in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
JTJosé Luis Pérez Triviño
José Luis Pérez Triviño
This paper addresses the possibility of robots engaging in sports. Recently, several movies like Ex-Machina, Chappi, and Transcendence challenge the spectator to think of the consequences of creating artificial intelligences (AI). Although we refer to athletes who have outstanding sporting performances as machines, for example, in cycling people say ‘the cyclist looked like a machine with wheels,’ the potential participation of such AI in sport has not been addressed. For our argument’s sake, we will assume that the creation of human-like robots who will mirror human athletes’ behavior in the playing field will be possible. Recent advances in cybernetics and robotics point in this way. As argued in the literature on philosophy of mind, the fact that intelligent robots seem to be doing something does not imply they are actually doing it. Understood in this way, sport can be conceived as a particular ‘imitation game’ or Turing test, which permits us to distinguish between an artificial intelligence and human beings. The use of sports as a test for AI is key to what we call ‘the Frías-Triviño test.’

14 September 2017 in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MSMathias Schubert
Mathias Schubert
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations represent the most restrictive regulatory intervention European club football has ever seen. Put simply, it demands from clubs to operate on the basis of their own football-related incomes. While the policy has attracted considerable attention from the economic and social sciences, very few contributions systematically investigate it from a philosophical-ethical perspective. The present paper fills this research gap by posing questions on FFP in relation to fair play as a normative concept. We draw on sport economic assessments concerning potential outcomes of FFP and argue that the policy should go beyond the mere pragmatic goal of promoting financial sustainability and truly aim for creating a level playing field, otherwise it should not be labeled ‘fair play’.

24 March 2020 in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
Bernard Suits’ account of play as an autotelic activity has been greatly influential in the philosophy of sport. Suits borrows the notion of ‘autotelicity’ from Aristotle’s ethics, formulating different iterations of the notions of ‘play’ and ‘game play’ that challenge the Stagirite’s views of the good life. In particular, Suits questions Aristotle’s identification of the good life with the one that involves engaging in contemplation, which Aristotle regards as the only fully autotelic and self-sufficient activity. Thus, Aristotle’s notion of ‘autotelicity’ and its connections to the good life are key to comprehend Suits’ views of play. Particularly, Suits draws on and revises Aristotle’s response to the question about the good life, as well as his notion of play (paidia), in order to identify game play as the purely autotelic and self-sufficient activity in which the good life consists.

3 April 2021 in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Francisco Javier Lopez FriasFrancisco Javier Lopez Frias
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias
In this article, I draw on psychoanalysis to provide a novel understanding of Suits' theory of games by analyzing the riddle in the Grasshopper's recurring dream, which Suits presents in his seminal and eponymous book. To do so, I first provide an overview of the psychoanalytical roots of Suits' thought, namely Eric Berne's transactional theory and Norman W. Brown's critical account of Freud's thought. Subsequently, I examine the Grasshopper's dream by revising Suits' use of psychoanalytical notions. To conclude, I argue that Suits deploys the dream to criticize the glorification of work and repression of play in human society, especially in modern capitalist society.