Online Federated Learning (OFL) is a real-time learning paradigm that sequentially executes parameter aggregation immediately for each random arriving client. To motivate clients to participate in OFL, it is crucial to offer appropriate incentives to offset the training resource consumption. However, the design of incentive mechanisms in OFL is constrained by the dynamic variability of Two-sided Incomplete Information (TII) concerning resources, where the server is unaware of the clients’ dynamically changing computational resources, while clients lack knowledge of the real-time communication resources allocated by the server. To incentivize clients to participate in training by offering dynamic rewards to each arriving client, we design a novel Dynamic Bayesian persuasion pricing for online Federated learning (DaringFed) under TII. Specifically, we begin by formulating the interaction between the server and clients as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem within a Bayesian persuasion game, and then demonstrate the existence of a unique Bayesian persuasion Nash equilibrium. By deriving the optimal design of DaringFed under one-sided incomplete information, we further analyze the approximate optimal design of DaringFed with a specific bound under TII. Finally, extensive evaluation conducted on real datasets demonstrate that DaringFed optimizes accuracy and converges speed by 16.99%, while experiments with synthetic datasets validate the convergence of estimate unknown values and the effectiveness of DaringFed in improving the server’s utility by up to 12.6%.

Online Federated Learning (OFL) is a real-time learning paradigm that sequentially executes parameter aggregation immediately for each random arriving client. To motivate clients to participate in OFL, it is crucial to offer appropriate incentives to offset the training resource consumption. However, the design of incentive mechanisms in OFL is constrained by the dynamic variability of Two-sided Incomplete Information (TII) concerning resources, where the server is unaware of the clients' dynamically changing computational resources, while clients lack knowledge of the real-time communication resources allocated by the server. To incentivize clients to participate in training by offering dynamic rewards to each arriving client, we design a novel Dynamic Bayesian persuasion pricing for online Federated learning (DaringFed) under TII. Specifically, we begin by formulating the interaction between the server and clients as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem within a Bayesian persuasion game, and then demonstrate the existence of a unique Bayesian persuasion Nash equilibrium. By deriving the optimal design of DaringFed under one-sided incomplete information, we further analyze the approximate optimal design of DaringFed with a specific bound under TII. Finally, extensive evaluation conducted on real datasets demonstrate that DaringFed optimizes accuracy and converges speed by 16.99%, while experiments with synthetic datasets validate the convergence of estimate unknown values and the effectiveness of DaringFed in improving the server's utility by up to 12.6%.

While semi-asynchronous federated learning (SAFL) combines the efficiency of synchronous training with the flexibility of asynchronous updates, it inherently suffers from participation bias, which is further exacerbated by non-IID data distributions. More importantly, hierarchical architecture shifts participation from individual clients to client groups, thereby further intensifying this issue. Despite notable advancements in SAFL research, most existing works still focus on conventional cloud-end architectures while largely overlooking the critical impact of non-IID data on scheduling across the cloud-edge-client hierarchy. To tackle these challenges, we propose FedCure, an innovative semi-asynchronous Federated learning framework that leverages coalition construction and participation-aware scheduling to mitigate participation bias with non-IID data. Specifically, FedCure operates through three key rules: (1) a preference rule that optimizes coalition formation by maximizing collective benefits and establishing theoretically stable partitions to reduce non-IID-induced performance degradation; (2) a scheduling rule that integrates the virtual queue technique with Bayesian-estimated coalition dynamics, mitigating efficiency loss while ensuring mean rate stability; and (3) a resource allocation rule that enhances computational efficiency by optimizing client CPU frequencies based on estimated coalition dynamics while satisfying delay requirements. Comprehensive experiments on four real-world datasets demonstrate that FedCure improves accuracy by up to 5.1x compared with four state-of-the-art baselines, while significantly enhancing efficiency with the lowest coefficient of variation 0.0223 for per-round latency and maintaining long-term balance across diverse scenarios.