Kassem Kallas

Prof. Dr. Kassem Kallas

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MBM. Barni
M. Barni
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
BTB. Tondi
B. Tondi
Backdoor attacks against CNNs represent a new threat against deep learning systems, due to the possibility of corrupting the training set so to induce an incorrect behaviour at test time. To avoid that the trainer recognises the presence of the corrupted samples, the corruption of the training set must be as stealthy as possible. Previous works have focused on the stealthiness of the perturbation injected into the training samples, however they all assume that the labels of the corrupted samples are also poisoned. This greatly reduces the stealthiness of the attack, since samples whose content does not agree with the label can be identified by visual inspection of the training set or by running a pre-classification step. In this paper we present a new backdoor attack without label poisoning Since the attack works by corrupting only samples of the target class, it has the additional advantage that it does not need to identify beforehand the class of the samples to be attacked at test time. Results obtained on the MNIST digits recognition task and the traffic signs classification task show that backdoor attacks without label poisoning are indeed possible, thus raising a new alarm regarding the use of deep learning in security-critical applications.

27 March 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
EBEric Bourbao
Eric Bourbao
YTYannick Teglia
Yannick Teglia
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
Deep learning has significantly transformed face recognition, enabling the deployment of large-scale, state-of-the-art solutions worldwide. However, the widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) and the rise of Machine Learning as a Service emphasize the need for secure DNNs. This paper revisits the face recognition threat model in the context of DNN ubiquity and the common practice of outsourcing their training and hosting to third-parties. Here, we identify backdoor attacks as a significant threat to modern DNN-based face recognition systems (FRS). Backdoor attacks involve an attacker manipulating a DNN’s training or deployment, injecting it with a stealthy and malicious behavior. Once the DNN has entered its inference stage, the attacker may activate the backdoor and compromise the DNN’s intended functionality. Given the critical nature of this threat to DNN-based FRS, our paper comprehensively surveys the literature of backdoor attacks and defenses previously demonstrated on FRS DNNs. As a last point, we highlight potential vulnerabilities and unexplored areas in FRS security.

1 May 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MBM. Barni
M. Barni
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
ENE. Nowroozi
E. Nowroozi
BTB. Tondi
B. Tondi
Recent studies have shown that Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are relatively easy to attack through the generation of so called adversarial examples. Such vulnerability also affects CNN-based image forensic tools. Research in deep learning has shown that adversarial examples exhibit a certain degree of transferability, i.e., they maintain part of their effectiveness even against CNN models other than the one targeted by the attack. This is a very strong property undermining the usability of CNN's in security-oriented applications. In this paper, we investigate if attack transferability also holds in image forensics applications. With specific reference to the case of manipulation detection, we analyse the results of several experiments considering different sources of mismatch between the CNN used to build the adversarial examples and the one adopted by the forensic analyst. The analysis ranges from cases in which the mismatch involves only the training dataset, to cases in which the attacker and the forensic analyst adopt different architectures. The results of our experiments show that, in the majority of the cases, the attacks are not transferable, thus easing the design of proper countermeasures at least when the attacker does not have a perfect knowledge of the target detector.

15 October 2024 in EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
WHWassim Hamidouche
Wassim Hamidouche
TFTeddy Furon
Teddy Furon
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are fundamental to modern applications like face recognition and autonomous driving. However, their security is a significant concern due to various integrity risks, such as backdoor attacks. In these attacks, compromised training data introduce malicious behaviors into the DNN, which can be exploited during inference or deployment. This paper presents a novel game-theoretic approach to model the interactions between an attacker and a defender in the context of a DNN backdoor attack. The contribution of this approach is multifaceted. First, it models the interaction between the attacker and the defender using a game-theoretic framework. Second, it designs a utility function that captures the objectives of both parties, integrating clean data accuracy and attack success rate. Third, it reduces the game model to a two-player zero-sum game, allowing for the identification of Nash equilibrium points through linear programming and a thorough analysis of equilibrium strategies. Additionally, the framework provides varying levels of flexibility regarding the control afforded to each player, thereby representing a range of real-world scenarios. Through extensive numerical simulations, the paper demonstrates the validity of the proposed framework and identifies insightful equilibrium points that guide both players in following their optimal strategies under different assumptions. The results indicate that fully using attack or defense capabilities is not always the optimal strategy for either party. Instead, attackers must balance inducing errors and minimizing the information conveyed to the defender, while defenders should focus on minimizing attack risks while preserving benign sample performance. These findings underscore the effectiveness and versatility of the proposed approach, showcasing optimal strategies across different game scenarios and highlighting its potential to enhance DNN security against backdoor attacks.

26 August 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
TFTeddy Furon
Teddy Furon
Backdoor attacks on deep neural networks work by injecting them with a malicious behavior during training. Such behavior can then be activated at test-time using cleverly-crafted triggers. Defending against backdoors is key in machine learning security in order to safeguard the trust between model providers and users. This paper demonstrates the open problem of back-door defense performance against a representative selection of backdoor attacks, with a main focus on input purification (a valuable defense category in black-box contexts where all DNN inputs are preprocessed in the hope of erasing a potential trigger). We show that current defenses are adversary-aware and dataset-dependent. They typically focus on patch-based attacks and simpler image classification datasets. This brittleness when using stand-alone defenses highlights the cat-and-mouse game currently affecting the backdoor literature. In this context, we propose a two-defense strategy using existing methods as a palliative solution while waiting for future developments.

9 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
TFTeddy Furon
Teddy Furon
Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to deep neural networks as they allow an adversary to inject a malicious behavior in a victim model during training. This paper addresses the challenge of defending against backdoor attacks in a black-box setting where the defender has a limited access to a suspicious model. In this paper, we introduce Importance Splitting, a Sequential Monte-Carlo method previously used in neural network robustness certification, as an off-the-shelf tool for defending against backdoors. We demonstrate that a black-box defender can leverage rare event simulation to assess the presence of a backdoor, reconstruct its trigger, and finally purify test-time input data in real-time. So-called REStore, our input purification defense proves effective in black-box scenarios because it uses triggers recovered with a query access to a model (only observing its logit, probit, or top-1 label outputs). We test our method on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CASIA-Webface. We believe we are the first to demonstrate that backdoors may be considered under the lens of rare event simulation. Moreover, REStore is the first one-stage, black-box input purification defense that approaches the performance of more complex comparables. REStore avoids gradient estimation, model reconstruction, or the vulnerable training of additional models.