Quentin Le Roux

Quentin Le Roux

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Quentin Le Roux

Thales Cyber & Digital Inria/Univ. de Rennes La Ciotat & Rennes France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 March 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
EBEric Bourbao
Eric Bourbao
YTYannick Teglia
Yannick Teglia
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
Deep learning has significantly transformed face recognition, enabling the deployment of large-scale, state-of-the-art solutions worldwide. However, the widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) and the rise of Machine Learning as a Service emphasize the need for secure DNNs. This paper revisits the face recognition threat model in the context of DNN ubiquity and the common practice of outsourcing their training and hosting to third-parties. Here, we identify backdoor attacks as a significant threat to modern DNN-based face recognition systems (FRS). Backdoor attacks involve an attacker manipulating a DNN’s training or deployment, injecting it with a stealthy and malicious behavior. Once the DNN has entered its inference stage, the attacker may activate the backdoor and compromise the DNN’s intended functionality. Given the critical nature of this threat to DNN-based FRS, our paper comprehensively surveys the literature of backdoor attacks and defenses previously demonstrated on FRS DNNs. As a last point, we highlight potential vulnerabilities and unexplored areas in FRS security.

15 October 2024 in EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KKKassem Kallas
Kassem Kallas
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
WHWassim Hamidouche
Wassim Hamidouche
TFTeddy Furon
Teddy Furon
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are fundamental to modern applications like face recognition and autonomous driving. However, their security is a significant concern due to various integrity risks, such as backdoor attacks. In these attacks, compromised training data introduce malicious behaviors into the DNN, which can be exploited during inference or deployment. This paper presents a novel game-theoretic approach to model the interactions between an attacker and a defender in the context of a DNN backdoor attack. The contribution of this approach is multifaceted. First, it models the interaction between the attacker and the defender using a game-theoretic framework. Second, it designs a utility function that captures the objectives of both parties, integrating clean data accuracy and attack success rate. Third, it reduces the game model to a two-player zero-sum game, allowing for the identification of Nash equilibrium points through linear programming and a thorough analysis of equilibrium strategies. Additionally, the framework provides varying levels of flexibility regarding the control afforded to each player, thereby representing a range of real-world scenarios. Through extensive numerical simulations, the paper demonstrates the validity of the proposed framework and identifies insightful equilibrium points that guide both players in following their optimal strategies under different assumptions. The results indicate that fully using attack or defense capabilities is not always the optimal strategy for either party. Instead, attackers must balance inducing errors and minimizing the information conveyed to the defender, while defenders should focus on minimizing attack risks while preserving benign sample performance. These findings underscore the effectiveness and versatility of the proposed approach, showcasing optimal strategies across different game scenarios and highlighting its potential to enhance DNN security against backdoor attacks.

1 August 2025 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
QRQuentin Le Roux
Quentin Le Roux
YTYannick Teglia
Yannick Teglia
TFTeddy Furon
Teddy Furon
PLPhilippe Loubet-Moundi
Philippe Loubet-Moundi
Face Recognition Systems that operate in unconstrained environments capture images under varying conditions,such as inconsistent lighting, or diverse face poses. These challenges require including a Face Detection module that regresses bounding boxes and landmark coordinates for proper Face Alignment. This paper shows the effectiveness of Object Generation Attacks on Face Detection, dubbed Face Generation Attacks, and demonstrates for the first time a Landmark Shift Attack that backdoors the coordinate regression task performed by face detectors. We then offer mitigations against these vulnerabilities.