To ensure security and stable quality, deeper cybersecurity evaluations are essential for the development of safety features and functionalities in vehicles. Among these, the AEB system is the most relevant. This research presents a comprehensive TARA of the AEB system, emphasizing the identification, validation, and mitigation of major cybersecurity threats and risks. We systematically examine potential attack vectors by utilizing the STRIDE threat model. This approach enables a detailed analysis of each security threat associated with AEB systems, providing insights into how malicious actors could use the attack paths. The assessment aligns with ISO/SAE 21434, which offers a robust framework for risk management in automotive cybersecurity and IT security, ensuring a thorough evaluation of a system’s architecture. By assessing the AEB system’s architecture against these standards, we identify key components and communication pathways that may be particularly prone to cyberattacks. The results of this analysis highlight critical flaws within the AEB framework and propose corrective measures to enhance cybersecurity resilience. This article provides a structured methodology for assessing and mitigating automotive cybersecurity risks in compliance with industry standards, aiming to facilitate the safe implementation of AEB technology and ultimately improve overall vehicle security and safety.

This paper presents a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of the takeover request (TOR) component in Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) for SAE Level 2–3 automation. A TOR prompts the human driver to retake control when the system approaches its Operational Design Domain limits or when risk increases; late, false, or muted requests directly impact safety. The study models the TOR pipeline (perception, driver monitoring, decision logic, in-vehicle networks, and Human–Machine Interface) as assets and data flows, applies STRIDE-based threat identification using Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool and Ansys Medini Analyze, and rates risks under ISO/SAE 21434 with traceability to ISO 26262, ISO 21448, and UNECE R155/R157. The assessment produces 165 threat rows, with an initial risk distribution of 1 Critical, 113 High, 34 Medium, and 17 Low. Results show that tampering, denial of service, and spoofing dominate the TOR threat landscape, with the central processing unit, sensor-to-CPU links, and HMI channels as primary trust anchors. After applying mitigation measures including secure boot, message authentication, intrusion detection, redundancy checks, and encrypted communication, the residual post-mitigation security levels were reduced to 0 Critical, 0 High, 13 Medium, 101 Low, and 51 Negligible. Unlike other ADAS TARA studies, this TOR-focused analysis shows that cybersecurity risk is shaped by the interaction between cyber compromise, driver-readiness estimation, HMI delivery, fallback execution, and the limited handover time budget. The results support a defence-in-depth mitigation strategy for secure TOR operation in SAE Level 2–3 vehicles.