YUEWU WANG

Prof. YUEWU WANG


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 August 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HSHe Sun
He Sun
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
With the wide usage of smartphones in our daily life, new malware is emerging to compromise the mobile OS and then steal or manipulate sensitive data from mobile applications. Forensic analysis tools demand a reliable and trustworthy memory acquisition of the operating systems running on the smartphones for further digital forensic analysis. However, a compromised OS may launch denial of service attacks to prevent a valid memory acquisition by forensic examiners. In this paper, we develop a TrustZone-based memory acquisition mechanism called TrustDump that is capable of reliably and securely obtaining the RAM memory and CPU registers of the mobile OS even if the OS has crashed or been compromised. TrustDump is isolated from the mobile OS by TrustZone. Instead of using a hypervisor to ensure the isolation between the OS and the memory acquisition tool, we rely on ARM TrustZone to achieve a hardware-assisted isolation with a small trusted computing base. TrustDump can include basic online analysis modules to catch malware in an early stage. Moreover, the acquired memory and register data can be sent to a remote server through a fast Micro-USB port for real-time forensics analysis when the OS runs or a slow serial port for further forensic analysis when the OS has crashed. A trusted graphical user interface is integrated in the TrustZone to authenticate the user and prevent the misuse of our memory acquisition tool. We build a TrustDump prototype on Freescale i.MX53 QSB.

10 June 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SXShouyin Xu
Shouyin Xu
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
LLLingguang Lei
Lingguang Lei
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
HHHeqing Huang
Heqing Huang
Container technology is widely adopted due to its features such as light weight and ease of rapid deployment. However, as an OS-level virtualization mechanism, container isolation relies on the kernel’s security mechanisms and the kernel permission data (usually non-control flow data) used by these mechanisms. None of the existing mitigation schemes for non-control flow data attacks provide an effective and practical solution to container security since they either trigger too much overhead, have limited effectiveness over attacks launched in specific ways, or can only be used to protect some specific kernel data. In addition, none of them accurately identify the kernel data associated with container isolation. In this paper, we provide a solution called Condo that enhances container isolation by protecting the associated kernel permission data. We first present a generic non-control flow kernel data protection mechanism that protects different types of kernel data uniformly with low overhead and is not limited by attack methods or data types. We then demystify the models of various kernel access control mechanisms in the container environment, and identify the subject and object permission data that are critical to container isolation. Finally, we provide a solution named Condo to enhance container isolation, which is completely transparent to the existing container ecosystem, including containerized applications and container management/orchestration tools such as Docker. Experimental results show that Condo can effectively reduce the compromises of container isolation due to memory corruption attacks with an acceptable overhead.

2 March 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JWJie Wang
Jie Wang
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
LLLingguang Lei
Lingguang Lei
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
QLQi Li
Qi Li
ARM TrustZone technology has been widely used to create Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for enhancing the security of applications. However, the increasing number of installed security-sensitive applications in the secure world will inevitably enlarge the trusted computing base (TCB) of TEE systems. To minimize the TCB of the secure world and increase application portability, Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs) are proposed to protect applications in enclaves created in the normal world. However, existing IEE systems cannot provide the same level of security as the TEE systems, particularly, on resolving the multi-vector attacks that include both physical memory disclosure attacks and software attacks. In this paper, we develop a new cache-assisted IEE system called CacheIEE that creates enclaves in the L1 data cache of the normal world to protect sensitive data against multi-vector attacks. First, by always storing the sensitive data in the L1 data cache, CacheIEE can effectively prevent physical memory disclosure attacks. Second, we protect the L1 data cache against untrusted rich OS running in other cores. To support more applications, CacheIEE can process large-size sensitive data in the L1 data cache with constrained capacity. We implement a system prototype of CacheIEE and verify its security and practicability.

10 October 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YBYi Bian
Yi Bian
FZFangyu Zheng
Fangyu Zheng
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
LLLingguang Lei
Lingguang Lei
YMYuan Ma
Yuan Ma
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
The rapid evolution of GPUs has emerged as a promising solution for accelerating the worldwide used SSL/TLS, which faces performance bottlenecks due to its underlying heavy cryptographic computations. Nevertheless, substantial structural adjustments from the parallel mode of GPUs to the serial mode of the SSL/TLS stack are imperative, potentially constraining the practical deployment of GPUs. In this paper, we propose AsyncGBP${}^{+}$, a three-level framework that facilitates the seamless conversion of cryptographic requests from synchronous to asynchronous mode. We conduct an in-depth analysis of the OpenSSL provider and cryptographic primitive features relevant to GPU implementations, aiming to fully exploit the potential of GPUs. Notably, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ supports three working settings (offline/online/hybrid), finely tailored for various public key cryptographic primitives, including traditional ones like X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA, and the quantum-safe CRYSTALS-Kyber. A comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ can efficiently achieve an improvement of up to 137.8$\times$ compared to the default OpenSSL provider (for X25519, Ed25519, ECDSA) and 113.30$\times$ compared to OpenSSL-compatible liboqs (for CRYSTALS-Kyber) in a single-process setting. Furthermore, AsyncGBP${}^{+}$ surpasses the current fastest commercial-off-the-shelf OpenSSL-compatible TLS accelerator with a 5.3$\times$ to 7.0$\times$ performance improvement.

30 October 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
LLLingguang Lei
Lingguang Lei
YHYi He
Yi He
KSKun Sun
Kun Sun
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
JWJian Weng
Jian Weng
The services in Android applications can be invoked either explicitly or implicitly before Android 5.0. However, since the implicit service invocations su.er service hijacking a.acks and thus lead to sensitive information leakage, they have been forbidden since Android 5.0. Thereaer since the Android system will simply throw an exception and crash the application that still invokes services implicitly, it was expected that application developers will be forced to convert the implicit service invocations to explicit ones by specifying the package name of the service to be called. In this paper, we revisit the service invocations by analyzing two sets of the same 1390 applications downloaded from Google Play Store before and a.er the the implicit service forbidden policy is enforced. We develop a static analysis framework called ISA to perform our study. Our analysis results show that the forbidden policy effectively reduces the number of vulnerable service invocations from 643 to 112, namely, 82.58% reduction. However, after a detailed analysis of the remaining 112 vulnerable invocations, we discover that the forbidden policy fails to resolve the service hijacking attacks. Among the 1390 applications downloaded in May 2017, we .nd 36 popular applications still vulnerable to service hijacking attacks, which can lead to the loss of user bank account and VPN login credentials, etc. Moreover, we .nd that the forbidden policy introduces a new type of denial of service attacks. Finally, we discuss the root challenges on resolving service hijacking a.acks and propose countermeasures to help mitigate the service hijacking attacks. © 2017 author(s).

17 August 2025
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
SMShuping Mao
Shuping Mao
RXRuozhou Xu
Ruozhou Xu
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
XCB, a tweakable enciphering mode, is part of IEEE Std. 1619.2 for shared storage media. We show that all versions of XCB are not secure through three plaintext recovery attacks. A key observation is that XCB behaves like an LRW1-type tweakable block cipher for single-block messages, which lacks CCA security. The first attack targets one-block XCB, using three queries to recover the plaintext. The second one requires four queries to recover the plaintext that excludes one block. The last one requires seven queries to recover the full plaintext. The first attack applies to any scheme that follows the XCB structure, whereas the latter two attacks work on all versions of XCB, exploiting the separable property of the underlying universal hash function. To address these flaws, we propose the XCB* structure, an improved version of XCB that adds only two XOR operations. We prove that XCB* is STPRP-secure when using AXU hash functions, SPRPs, and a secure random-IV-based stream cipher.