Shuping Mao

Dr. Shuping Mao


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 August 2025
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
SMShuping Mao
Shuping Mao
RXRuozhou Xu
Ruozhou Xu
JJJiwu Jing
Jiwu Jing
YWYUEWU WANG
YUEWU WANG
XCB, a tweakable enciphering mode, is part of IEEE Std. 1619.2 for shared storage media. We show that all versions of XCB are not secure through three plaintext recovery attacks. A key observation is that XCB behaves like an LRW1-type tweakable block cipher for single-block messages, which lacks CCA security. The first attack targets one-block XCB, using three queries to recover the plaintext. The second one requires four queries to recover the plaintext that excludes one block. The last one requires seven queries to recover the full plaintext. The first attack applies to any scheme that follows the XCB structure, whereas the latter two attacks work on all versions of XCB, exploiting the separable property of the underlying universal hash function. To address these flaws, we propose the XCB* structure, an improved version of XCB that adds only two XOR operations. We prove that XCB* is STPRP-secure when using AXU hash functions, SPRPs, and a secure random-IV-based stream cipher.

24 November 2025 in Entropy
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Journal Article
Open access
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SMShuping Mao
Shuping Mao
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
YJYan Jia
Yan Jia
GLGang Liu
Gang Liu
BLBing Liu
Bing Liu
We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.

7 November 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
YJYan Jia
Yan Jia
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
LHLei Hu
Lei Hu
GLGang Liu
Gang Liu
TGTingting Guo
Tingting Guo
SMShuping Mao
Shuping Mao


9 November 2025 in Mathematics
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SMShuping Mao
Shuping Mao
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
YJYan Jia
Yan Jia
GLGang Liu
Gang Liu
YCYing Chen
Ying Chen
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.