Andy J. Wills

Prof. Andy J. Wills

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2016 in Psychological Bulletin
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MPMike E. Le Pelley
Mike E. Le Pelley
CMChris J. Mitchell
Chris J. Mitchell
TBTom Beesley
Tom Beesley
DGDavid N. George
David N. George
Andy J. WillsAndy J. Wills
Andy J. Wills
This article presents a comprehensive survey of research concerning interactions between associative learning and attention in humans. Four main findings are described. First, attention is biased toward stimuli that predict their consequences reliably (learned predictiveness). This finding is consistent with the approach taken by Mackintosh (1975) in his attentional model of associative learning in nonhuman animals. Second, the strength of this attentional bias is modulated by the value of the outcome (learned value). That is, predictors of high-value outcomes receive especially high levels of attention. Third, the related but opposing idea that uncertainty may result in increased attention to stimuli (Pearce & Hall, 1980), receives less support. This suggests that hybrid models of associative learning, incorporating the mechanisms of both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall theories, may not be required to explain data from human participants. Rather, a simpler model, in which attention to stimuli is determined by how strongly they are associated with significant outcomes, goes a long way to account for the data on human attentional learning. The last main finding, and an exciting area for future research and theorizing, is that learned predictiveness and learned value modulate both deliberate attentional focus, and more automatic attentional capture. The automatic influence of learning on attention does not appear to fit the traditional view of attention as being either goal-directed or stimulus-driven. Rather, it suggests a new kind of “derived” attention.

1 May 2007 in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
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Journal Article
Closed access
Andy J. WillsAndy J. Wills
Andy J. Wills
ALA. Lavric
A. Lavric
GCG. S. Croft
G. S. Croft
THTim Hodgson
Tim Hodgson
Prediction error (“surprise”) affects the rate of learning: We learn more rapidly about cues for which we initially make incorrect predictions than cues for which our initial predictions are correct. The current studies employ electrophysiological measures to reveal early attentional differentiation of events that differ in their previous involvement in errors of predictive judgment. Error-related events attract more attention, as evidenced by features of event-related scalp potentials previously implicated in selective visual attention (selection negativity, augmented anterior N1). The earliest differences detected occurred around 120 msec after stimulus onset, and distributed source localization (LORETA) indicated that the inferior temporal regions were one source of the earliest differences. In addition, stimuli associated with the production of prediction errors show higher dwell times in an eye-tracking procedure. Our data support the view that early attentional processes play a role in human associative learning.

1 December 2013 in Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
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Journal Article
Closed access
HRHenrietta Roberts
Henrietta Roberts
EWEdward Watkins
Edward Watkins
Andy J. WillsAndy J. Wills
Andy J. Wills

1 January 2012 in Psychological Bulletin
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Journal Article
Closed access
Andy J. WillsAndy J. Wills
Andy J. Wills
EPEmmanuel M. Pothos
Emmanuel M. Pothos
Categorization is one of the fundamental building blocks of cognition, and the study of categorization is notable for the extent to which formal modeling has been a central and influential component of research. However, the field has seen a proliferation of noncomplementary models with little consensus on the relative adequacy of these accounts. Progress in assessing the relative adequacy of formal categorization models has, to date, been limited because (a) formal model comparisons are narrow in the number of models and phenomena considered and (b) models do not often clearly define their explanatory scope. Progress is further hampered by the practice of fitting models with arbitrarily variable parameters to each data set independently. Reviewing examples of good practice in the literature, we conclude that model comparisons are most fruitful when relative adequacy is assessed by comparing well-defined models on the basis of the number and proportion of irreversible, ordinal, penetrable successes (principles of minimal flexibility, breadth, good-enough precision, maximal simplicity, and psychological focus).


20 May 2016 in Human Brain Mapping
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Journal Article
Closed access
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KCKathryn L. Carpenter
Kathryn L. Carpenter
Andy J. WillsAndy J. Wills
Andy J. Wills
ABAbdelmalek Benattayallah
Abdelmalek Benattayallah
FMFraser Milton
Fraser Milton