We study the dynamics and stability of the economics of crime and punishment game from an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we model the interaction between agents and controllers as an asymmetric game exploring the dynamics of the classic static model using a replicator dynamics equation, given exogenous levels of monitoring and criminal sanctions. The dynamics show five possible equilibria, from which three are stable. Our results show that a culture of honest agents is never stable; however when the penalty is high enough, the system will neutrally tend to an equilibrium of honest agents and a monitoring firm. By contrast, when the probability of detecting wrongdoing is small, the system, in some cases, will remain in a transient state, in which it is impossible to predict the proportion of honest agents.
The main aim of this paper is to present a longitudinal analysis of the AmericaEconomia MBA Ranking for the period 2005–2014. AmericaEconomia was the first international ranking specifically devoted to Latin American business schools, and with data gathered from this publication, we build a panel to study its stability and the main determinants of a school‘s position in such ranking. We examine the reliability of the ranking, that is whether changes in the relative positions are not just due to white noise, and compare its stability with those of the US and other global rankings. We also empirically determine which are the key quality variables this ranking is promoting for Latin America Business Schools and the evolution of these business schools during the period under study. Unlike previous literature that usually considers dynamic Tobit models for ranking analysis, we put forwards an alternative methodology based on a system GMM estimator with first-differenced instruments. We argue that dynamic Tobit models are appropriate only if you have truncated data about the ranking variable but full data on Business Schools variables.
I. Sovereign-rating studies usually estimate rating-level regressions (Afonso, Gomes, and Rother 2011; Cantor and Packer 1996). Yet ratings are persistent states: the surveillance question is not o...