Pascal Berrang

Pascal Berrang

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Pascal Berrang

University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 April 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZWZhipeng Wang
Zhipeng Wang
SCStefanos Chaliasos
Stefanos Chaliasos
KQKaihua Qin
Kaihua Qin
LZLiyi Zhou
Liyi Zhou
LGLifeng Gao
Lifeng Gao
AGArthur Gervais
Arthur Gervais
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) mixers are one of the most widely-used blockchain privacy solutions, operating on top of smart contract-enabled blockchains. We find that ZKP mixers are tightly intertwined with the growing number of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) attacks and Blockchain Extractable Value (BEV) extractions. Through coin flow tracing, we discover that 205 blockchain attackers and 2, 595 BEV extractors leverage mixers as their source of funds, while depositing a total attack revenue of 412.87M USD. Moreover, the US OFAC sanctions against the largest ZKP mixer, Tornado.Cash, have reduced the mixer’s daily deposits by more than . Further, ZKP mixers advertise their level of privacy through a so-called anonymity set size, which similarly to k-anonymity allows a user to hide among a set of k other users. Through empirical measurements, we, however, find that these anonymity set claims are mostly inaccurate. For the most popular mixers on Ethereum (ETH) and Binance Smart Chain (BSC), we show how to reduce the anonymity set size on average by and respectively. Our empirical evidence is also the first to suggest a differing privacy-predilection of users on ETH and BSC. State-of-the-art ZKP mixers are moreover interwoven with the DeFi ecosystem by offering anonymity mining (AM) incentives, i.e., users receive monetary rewards for mixing coins. However, contrary to the claims of related work, we find that AM does not necessarily improve the quality of a mixer’s anonymity set. Our findings indicate that AM attracts privacy-ignorant users, who then do not contribute to improving the privacy of other mixer users.

24 July 2018 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Computational Biology and Bioinformatics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MBMichael Backes
Michael Backes
PBPascal Berrang
Pascal Berrang
MHMathias Humbert
Mathias Humbert
XSXiaoyu Shen
Xiaoyu Shen
VWVerena Wolf
Verena Wolf
The dramatically decreasing costs of DNA sequencing have triggered more than a million humans to have their genotypes sequenced. Moreover, these individuals increasingly make their genomic data publicly available, thereby creating privacy threats for themselves and their relatives because of their DNA similarities. More generally, an entity that gains access to a significant fraction of sequenced genotypes might be able to infer even the genomes of unsequenced individuals. In this paper, we propose a simulation-based model for quantifying the impact of continuously sequencing and publicizing personal genomic data on a population's genomic privacy. Our simulation probabilistically models data sharing and takes into account events such as migration and interracial mating. We exemplarily instantiate our simulation with a sample population of 1,000 individuals and evaluate the privacy under multiple settings over 6,000 genomic variants and a subset of phenotype-related variants. Our findings demonstrate that an increasing sharing rate in the future entails a substantial negative effect on the privacy of all older generations. Moreover, we find that mixed populations face a less severe erosion of privacy over time than more homogeneous populations. Finally, we demonstrate that genomic-data sharing can be much more detrimental for the privacy of the phenotype-related variants.

1 June 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PBPascal Berrang
Pascal Berrang
PSPhilipp von Styp-Rekowsky
Philipp von Styp-Rekowsky
MWMarvin Wissfeld
Marvin Wissfeld
BFBruno Franca
Bruno Franca
RTReto Trinkler
Reto Trinkler
Distributed ledgers have the potential to revolutionize the financial landscape by removing trusted third parties. At the heart of most distributed ledgers is their consensus protocol. The consensus protocol describes the way participants in a distributed network interact with each other to obtain and agree on a shared state. While classical Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) algorithms are designed to work in closed, size-limited networks only, modern distributed ledgers - and blockchains in particular - often focus on open, permissionless networks. In this paper, we present a novel blockchain consensus algorithm for open, permissionless networks, called Albatross, inspired by speculative BFT algorithms. We argue that the protocol is secure under regular PBFT security assumptions and has a theoretical performance close to the maximum for single-chain Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithms. We conclude by describing our future work related to Albatross.

12 April 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ELEndong Liu
Endong Liu
MRMark Ryan
Mark Ryan
LZLiyi Zhou
Liyi Zhou
PBPascal Berrang
Pascal Berrang