Code deobfuscation, which attempts to simplify code that has been intentionally obfuscated to prevent understanding, is a critical technique for downstream security analysis tasks like malware detection. While there has been significant prior work on code deobfuscation, most techniques either do not handle control flow obfuscations that modify control flow or they target specific classes of control flow obfuscations, making them unsuitable for handling new types of obfuscations or combinations of existing ones. In this paper, we study a new deobfuscation technique that is based on program synthesis and that can handle a broad class of control flow obfuscations. Given an obfuscated program P , our approach aims to synthesize a smallest program that is a control-flow reduction of P and that is semantically equivalent. Since our method does not assume knowledge about the types of obfuscations that have been applied to the original program, the underlying synthesis problem ends up being very challenging. To address this challenge, we propose a novel trace-informed compositional synthesis algorithm that leverages hints present in dynamic traces of the obfuscated program to decompose the synthesis problem into a set of simpler subproblems. In particular, we show how dynamic traces can be useful for inferring a suitable control-flow skeleton of the deobfuscated program and performing independent synthesis of each basic block. We have implemented this approach in a tool called Chisel and evaluate it on 546 benchmarks that have been obfuscated using combinations of six different obfuscation techniques. Our evaluation shows that our approach is effective and that it produces code that is almost identical (modulo variable renaming) to the original (non-obfuscated) program in 86% of cases. Our evaluation also shows that Chisel significantly outperforms existing techniques.
Software protection researchers often struggle with the evaluation of MATE software protections and attacks. Evaluations often are incomplete and not representative of the practice. This can in part be explained by a lack of standardized, generally applicable models, tools, and methodologies for evaluating how reverse engineering attack strategies are executed. The framework of related components proposed in this paper is an attempt to provide exactly that. It includes a meta-model and supporting tools for modeling the knowledge that reverse engineers acquire as they execute their strategies, a meta-model to estimate the required effort of those strategies, and tools to capture strategic activities from data streams collected during human reverse engineering experiments. Their use is demonstrated on three example reverse engineering strategies.