Yaonan Jin

Yaonan Jin

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Yaonan Jin

Huawei, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 October 2023 in Journal of the ACM
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YJYaonan Jin
Yaonan Jin
PLPinyan Lu
Pinyan Lu
We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/ e 2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

21 July 2022 in arXiv
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Preprint
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YJYaonan Jin
Yaonan Jin
SJShunhua Jiang
Shunhua Jiang
PLPinyan Lu
Pinyan Lu
HZHengjie Zhang
Hengjie Zhang
This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the $k$-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has $k$ copies of an indivisible item and faces $n$ unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others have been widely employed in practice and widely studied in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}, {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, {\sf $(k + 1)$-th Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Regarding a pair of mechanisms, we investigate the largest possible ratio between the two revenues (a.k.a.\ the revenue gap), over all possible value distributions of the buyers. Divide these four mechanisms into two groups: (i)~the discriminating mechanism group, {\sf Myerson Auction} and {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, and (ii)~the anonymous mechanism group, {\sf Anonymous Reserve} and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Within one group, the involved two mechanisms have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $1 + \Theta(1 / \sqrt{k})$. In contrast, any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $\Theta(\log k)$.

12 April 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HCHoushuang Chen
Houshuang Chen
YJYaonan Jin
Yaonan Jin
PLPinyan Lu
Pinyan Lu
CZChihao Zhang
Chihao Zhang

27 October 2026 in SIAM Journal on Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YJYaonan Jin
Yaonan Jin
PLPinyan Lu
Pinyan Lu
We study revenue maximization in the unit-demand single-buyer setting. Our main result is that Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing guarantees a tight 3-approximation to Duality Relaxation Benchmark (Chawla, Malec, and Sivan, EC’10 and GEB’15; Cai, Devanur, and Weinberg, STOC’16 and [ SIAM J. Comput., 50 (2021), pp. STOC16-160–STOC16-200]), breaking the barrier of 4 since Chawla et al. [ Proceedings of STOC’10, 2010, pp. 311–320] and Chawla, Malec, and Sivan (EC’10 and GEB’15). To our knowledge, this is the first benchmark-tight revenue guarantee of any simple multi-item mechanism. Technically, all previous work employs Myerson Auction as an intermediary. The barrier of 4 follows as Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 2-approximation to Myerson Auction , which then achieves a tight 2-approximation to Duality Relaxation Benchmark . Instead, our new approach avoids Myerson Auction , thus enabling the improvement. Central to our work are a benchmark-based 3-competitive prophet inequality and its fully constructive proof. Such prophet inequality variants will likely find applications in, e.g., multi-item mechanism design, when the optimal revenue objective is relaxed to various more accessible benchmarks. We complement our benchmark-tight ratio with an impossibility result. All previous works, including ours, follow the single-dimensional representative approach introduced by Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg [ Proceedings of EC’07, 2007, pp. 243–251]. Against Duality Relaxation Benchmark , it turns out that this approach cannot beat our bound of 3 for a large class of Item Pricing .