Hengjie Zhang

Hengjie Zhang

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Hengjie Zhang

Columbia University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2024 in Physics of Fluids
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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PHPeiyu He
Peiyu He
SJShiying Jiang
Shiying Jiang
HZHengjie Zhang
Hengjie Zhang
FLFuzhu Li
Fuzhu Li
LYLiang Yu
Liang Yu
YWYun Wang
Yun Wang
Submerged cavitating waterjet micro-forming is a novel jetting technology. Existing detection devices cannot accurately detect bubble distribution in still water domains and target workpiece processing areas. To investigate bubble generation and distribution in still water domains and their influence on target micro-forming, a submerged cavitating waterjet micro-forming fluid–solid coupling numerical model was established in this paper. The distribution of submerged cavitating waterjet cavitation effects and the hammering of micro waterjets on metal plates under the action of cavitation bubbles, as well as the coupled forces, were analyzed. The results show that bubble distribution in still water domains is closely related to turbulence, vortices, and pressure distributions. The collapse of cavitation bubbles generates enormous pressure, and the pressure generated by the collapse of cavitation bubbles causes the micro waterjet hammers to produce annular deformation zones on the metal plates. The bubble distribution laws and theoretical basis of cavitation micro-forming technology in submerged waterjets are provided in this study, which has very important engineering application significance.

21 July 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
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YJYaonan Jin
Yaonan Jin
SJShunhua Jiang
Shunhua Jiang
PLPinyan Lu
Pinyan Lu
HZHengjie Zhang
Hengjie Zhang
This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the $k$-unit setting, where a monopolist seller has $k$ copies of an indivisible item and faces $n$ unit-demand buyers (whose value distributions can be non-identical). Four basic mechanisms among others have been widely employed in practice and widely studied in the literature: {\sf Myerson Auction}, {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, {\sf $(k + 1)$-th Price Auction with Anonymous Reserve}, and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Regarding a pair of mechanisms, we investigate the largest possible ratio between the two revenues (a.k.a.\ the revenue gap), over all possible value distributions of the buyers. Divide these four mechanisms into two groups: (i)~the discriminating mechanism group, {\sf Myerson Auction} and {\sf Sequential Posted-Pricing}, and (ii)~the anonymous mechanism group, {\sf Anonymous Reserve} and {\sf Anonymous Pricing}. Within one group, the involved two mechanisms have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $1 + \Theta(1 / \sqrt{k})$. In contrast, any two mechanisms from the different groups have an asymptotically tight revenue gap of $\Theta(\log k)$.