Javier Cembrano

Javier Cembrano

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Javier Cembrano

Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 April 2022 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
JCJosé Correa
José Correa
VVVictor Verdugo
Victor Verdugo
Significance: A cornerstone in the modern political organization of societies is the existence of a deliberative assembly, reflecting the needs of different population segments. As modern societies become more complex, representation according to dimensions beyond political affiliation and geography is demanded; examples include gender balance and ethnicity. As this dimensionality increases, the task becomes more challenging and requires more sophisticated mathematical tools. In this paper, we initiate the study of multidimensional apportionments and show that, in three and more dimensions, their existence is not guaranteed. However, our main result states that it is possible to elect a house nearly respecting proportionality of representation along several dimensions simultaneously. We finally illustrate the potential of our approach with recent election data.

1 February 2024 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
DHDavid Hannon
David Hannon
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm

7 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm
We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be randomized, selects one individual from a group of n based on nominations among members of the group; a mechanism is impartial if the selection of an individual is independent of nominations cast by that individual, and α-optimal if under any circumstance the expected number of nominations received by the selected individual is at least α times that received by any individual. In a many-nominations model, where individuals may cast an arbitrary number of nominations, the so-called permutation mechanism is 1/2-optimal, and this is best possible. In the single-nomination model, where each individual casts exactly one nomination, the permutation mechanism does better and prior to this work was known to be 67/108-optimal but no better than 2/3-optimal. We show that it is in fact 2/3-optimal for all n. This result is obtained via tight bounds on the performance of the mechanism for graphs with maximum degree Δ, for any Δ, which we prove using an adversarial argument. We then show that the permutation mechanism is not best possible; indeed, by combining the permutation mechanism, another mechanism called plurality with runner-up, and some new ideas, 2105/3147-optimality can be achieved for all n. We finally give new upper bounds on α for any α-optimal impartial mechanism. They improve on the existing upper bounds for all n ≥ 7 and imply that no impartial mechanism can be better than 76/105-optimal for all n; they do not preclude the existence of a (3/4 − ε)-optimal impartial mechanism for arbitrary ε > 0 if n is large.

9 December 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm

2 July 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
AMAndrés Moraga
Andrés Moraga
VVVictor Verdugo
Victor Verdugo

31 December 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
SGSvenja M. Griesbach
Svenja M. Griesbach
MSMaximilian J. Stahlberg
Maximilian J. Stahlberg