Felix Fischer

Felix Fischer

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Felix Fischer

School of Mathematical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2022 in Mathematics of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JCJosé Correa
José Correa
PDPaul Dütting
Paul Dütting
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
KSKevin Schewior
Kevin Schewior
A central object of study in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for independent and identically distributed random variables: given a sequence of random variables [ ] drawn independently from the same distribution, the goal is to choose a stopping time τ such that for the maximum value of α and for all distributions, [ ]. What makes this problem challenging is that the decision whether [ ] may only depend on the values of the random variables [ ] and on the distribution F. For a long time, the best known bound for the problem had been [ ], but recently a tight bound of [ ] was obtained. The case where F is unknown, such that the decision whether [ ] may depend only on the values of the random variables [ ], is equally well motivated but has received much less attention. A straightforward guarantee for this case of [ ] can be derived from the well-known optimal solution to the secretary problem, where an arbitrary set of values arrive in random order and the goal is to maximize the probability of selecting the largest value. We show that this bound is in fact tight. We then investigate the case where the stopping time may additionally depend on a limited number of samples from F, and we show that, even with o(n) samples, [ ]. On the other hand, n samples allow for a significant improvement, whereas [ ] samples are equivalent to knowledge of the distribution: specifically, with n samples, [ ] and [ ], and with [ ] samples, [ ] for any [ ].

14 September 2018 in Mathematics of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDPaul Dütting
Paul Dütting
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
DPDavid C. Parkes
David C. Parkes
Ideally, the properties of an economic mechanism should hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to participants. Focusing on the design of robust position auctions, we seek mechanisms that possess an efficient equilibrium and guarantee high revenue in every efficient equilibrium, under complete and incomplete information. A generalized first-price auction that is expressive in the sense of allowing multidimensional bids turns out to be the only standard design able to achieve this goal, even when valuations are one dimensional. The equilibria under complete information are obtained via Bernheim and Whinston’s profit target strategies, those under incomplete information via an appropriate generalization thereof. Particularly interesting from a technical perspective is the incomplete information case, where the standard technique for establishing equilibrium existence due to Myerson is generalized to a setting in which the bid space h...

1 February 2024 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
DHDavid Hannon
David Hannon
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm

7 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm
We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be randomized, selects one individual from a group of n based on nominations among members of the group; a mechanism is impartial if the selection of an individual is independent of nominations cast by that individual, and α-optimal if under any circumstance the expected number of nominations received by the selected individual is at least α times that received by any individual. In a many-nominations model, where individuals may cast an arbitrary number of nominations, the so-called permutation mechanism is 1/2-optimal, and this is best possible. In the single-nomination model, where each individual casts exactly one nomination, the permutation mechanism does better and prior to this work was known to be 67/108-optimal but no better than 2/3-optimal. We show that it is in fact 2/3-optimal for all n. This result is obtained via tight bounds on the performance of the mechanism for graphs with maximum degree Δ, for any Δ, which we prove using an adversarial argument. We then show that the permutation mechanism is not best possible; indeed, by combining the permutation mechanism, another mechanism called plurality with runner-up, and some new ideas, 2105/3147-optimality can be achieved for all n. We finally give new upper bounds on α for any α-optimal impartial mechanism. They improve on the existing upper bounds for all n ≥ 7 and imply that no impartial mechanism can be better than 76/105-optimal for all n; they do not preclude the existence of a (3/4 − ε)-optimal impartial mechanism for arbitrary ε > 0 if n is large.

9 December 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JCJavier Cembrano
Javier Cembrano
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
MKMax Klimm
Max Klimm

1 May 2019 in Operations Research Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FEFranziska Eberle
Franziska Eberle
FFFelix Fischer
Felix Fischer
JMJannik Matuschke
Jannik Matuschke
NMNicole Megow
Nicole Megow