Jordi Teixidó-Figueras

Jordi Teixidó-Figueras

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Jordi Teixidó-Figueras

Department of Applied Economics and GIM-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
6 May 2014 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
JDJuan Antonio Duro
Juan Antonio Duro
JTJordi Teixido-Figueras
Jordi Teixido-Figueras
EPEmilio Padilla
Emilio Padilla
This paper uses the possibilities provided by the regression-based inequality decomposition (Fields, 2003) to explore the contribution of different explanatory factors to international inequality in CO2 emissions per capita. In contrast to previous emissions inequality decompositions, which were based on identity relationships (Duro and Padilla, 2006), this methodology does not impose any a priori specific relationship. Thus, it allows an assessment of the contribution to inequality of different relevant variables. In short, the paper appraises the relative contributions of affluence, sectoral composition, demographic factors and climate. The analysis is applied to selected years of the period 1993-2007. The results show the important (though decreasing) share of the contribution of demographic factors, as well as a significant contribution of affluence and sectoral composition.

1 March 2016 in Ecological Indicators
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JTJordi Teixidó-Figueras
Jordi Teixidó-Figueras
JSJulia K. Steinberger
Julia K. Steinberger
FKFridolin Krausmann
Fridolin Krausmann
HHHelmut Haberl
Helmut Haberl
Thomas WiedmannThomas Wiedmann
Thomas Wiedmann
TKThomas Kastner
Thomas Kastner

1 January 2022 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XFXavier Fageda
Xavier Fageda
JTJordi J. Teixidó
Jordi J. Teixidó

1 September 2013 in Ecological Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JDJuan Antonio Duro
Juan Antonio Duro
JTJordi Teixidó-Figueras
Jordi Teixidó-Figueras

4 December 2018 in Climate Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SVStefano F. Verde
Stefano F. Verde
JTJordi Teixidó
Jordi Teixidó
CMClaudio Marcantonini
Claudio Marcantonini
XLXavier Labandeira
Xavier Labandeira
This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction. Key policy insights

3 March 2016 in Climatic Change
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JGJosé-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
JMJosé- Manuel
José- Manuel
JTJordi Teixidó-Figueras
Jordi Teixidó-Figueras
CVCori Vilellla
Cori Vilellla
An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2 ∘C threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158–1162, 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O’Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios.