14 July 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Mobile edge computing (MEC) facilitates computation offloading to edge server and task processing via device-to-device (D2D) collaboration. Existing works mainly focus on centralized network-assisted offloading solutions, which are unscalable to collaborations among massive users. In this paper, we propose a joint framework of decentralized D2D collaboration and task offloading for MEC systems with large populations. Specifically, we utilize the power of two choices for D2D collaboration, which enables users to assist each other in a decentralized manner. Due to short-range D2D communication and user movements, we formulate a mean field model on a finite-degree and dynamic graph to analyze the collaboration state evolution. We derive the existence, uniqueness and convergence of the state stationary point to provide a tractable collaboration performance. Complementing this D2D collaboration, we further build a Stackelberg game to model users’ task offloading, where the provider, managing many servers, is the leader to determine service prices, while users are followers to make offloading decisions. By embedding Stackelberg game into Lyapunov optimization, we develop an online offloading and pricing scheme, which can optimize servers’ service utility or fairness, and users’ system cost simultaneously. Extensive evaluations show that D2D collaboration can mitigate users’ workloads by $73.8\%$ and fair pricing can promote servers’ utility fairness by $15.87\%$ .
12 May 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Mobile edge computing facilitates users to offload computation tasks to edge servers for meeting their stringent delay requirements. Previous works mainly explore task offloading when system-side information is given (e.g., server processing speed, cellular data rate), or centralized offloading under system uncertainty. But both generally fall short of handling task placement involving many coexisting users in an uncertain environment. In this paper, we develop a multi-user offloading framework considering unknown yet stochastic system-side information to enable a decentralized user-initiated service placement under overlapping server coverage. Specifically, we formulate the dynamic task placement as an online multi-user multi-armed bandit process, and propose a decentralized epoch based offloading (DEBO) to optimize user rewards which are subjected under network delay. We consider both cases without and with neighboring edge feedback once users’ tasks are processed, where the latter incorporates system-side information sharing among edge servers for an enhanced task placement. For both cases, we show that DEBO can gradually deduce the optimal user-server assignment during dynamic offloading, thereby achieving a close-to-optimal service performance and tight $O(\log _{2}\!\!T)$ regret. Moreover, we generalize DEBO to various common scenarios such as unknown reward gap, dynamic entering or leaving of clients, and fair reward distribution, while further exploring when users’ offloaded tasks require heterogeneous computing resources. Particularly, we accomplish a sub-linear regret for each of these instances. Real measurements based evaluations corroborate the superiority of our offloading schemes over state-of-the-art approaches in optimizing delay-sensitive rewards.
18 October 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Effective incentive mechanisms are invaluable in crowdsensing to stimulate the enthusiasm of strategic users. However, existing work focusing on multi-task allocation with the objective of purely maximizing the social utility may result in the problem of unbalanced allocation, which may damage the social fairness. This motivates us to introduce proportional fairness into the design of a novel fairness-aware incentive mechanism for the first time. Specifically, we first model the interaction of multi-task allocation in crowdsensing as a multi-requester multi-worker Stackelberg game, and then transform the fairness-aware multi-task allocation problem into a fairness-aware incentive mechanism design problem. Next, we prove that there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, and also show that it can be efficiently derived through cautiously proposed algorithms. Since the existing equilibrium may not be optimal, we further design a secondary allocation rule to maximize both social utility and system performance, while achieving proportional fairness at a minimum cost. Finally, extensive experiments using both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the superiority of our proposed mechanism compared to the state of the arts.
1 March 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Mobile chargers (MCs) are usually dispatched to deliver energy to sensors in wireless rechargeable sensor networks (WRSNs) due to its flexibility and easy maintenance. This paper concerns the fundamental issue of charging path DEsign with the Minimized energy cOst (DEMO), i.e., given a set of rechargeable sensors, we appropriately design the MC’s charging path to minimize the energy cost which is due to the wireless charging and the MC’s movement, such that the different charging demand of each sensor is satisfied. Solving DEMO is NP-hard and involves handling the tradeoff between the charging efficiency and the moving cost. To address DEMO, we first investigate how to identify a single charging position where the MC could stay to charge a set of sensors distributed within a small area with the maximized charging efficiency. Then, based on the result obtained in the case of optimizing a single charging position, we develop a computational geometry-based algorithm to deploy multiple charging positions within the whole network, by considering the fixed and finite charging range of the MC. We prove that the designed algorithm has the approximation ratio of $O\!\left(\ln\!N\right)$ , where $N$ is the number of sensors. Then we construct the charging path by calculating the shortest Hamiltonian cycle passing through all the deployed charging positions within the network. In addition, we investigate the impact of the network topology as well as the distribution of charging demands among sensors on the MC’s energy cost during a charging tour. Extensive evaluations validate the superiority of our path design in terms of the MC’s energy cost minimization, compared with existing main algorithms.
1 November 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Although federated learning (FL) enables collaborative training across multiple data silos in a privacy-protected manner, naively minimizing the aggregated loss to facilitate an efficient federation may compromise its fairness. Many efforts have been devoted to maintaining similar average accuracy across clients by reweighing the loss function while clients' potential contributions are largely ignored. This, however, is often detrimental since treating all clients equally will harm the interests of those clients with more contribution. To tackle this issue, we introduce utopian fairness to expound the relationship between individual earning and collaborative productivity, and propose Fed erated- U to P ia (FedUP), a novel FL framework that balances both efficient collaboration and fair aggregation. For the distributed collaboration, we model the training process among strategic clients as a supermodular game, which facilitates a rational incentive design through the optimal reward. As for the model aggregation, we design a weight attention mechanism to compute the fair aggregation weights by minimizing the performance bias among heterogeneous clients. Particularly, we utilize the alternating optimization theory to bridge the gap between collaboration efficiency and utopian fairness, and theoretically prove that FedUP has fair model performance with fast-rate training convergence. Extensive experiments using both synthetic and real datasets demonstrate the superiority of FedUP.
6 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Cross-silo federated learning (FL) enables multiple institutions (clients) to collaboratively build a global model without sharing private data. To prevent privacy leakage during aggregation, homomorphic encryption (HE) is widely used to encrypt model updates, yet incurs high computation and communication overheads. To reduce these overheads, packed HE (PHE) has been proposed to encrypt multiple plaintexts into a single ciphertext. However, the original design of PHE assumes all clients share a single private key, making the system vulnerable to security threats of ciphertexts being intercepted and decrypted by honest-but-curious clients. Also, it does not consider the heterogeneity among different clients, resulting in undermined training efficiency with slow convergence and stragglers. To address these challenges, we propose FedPHE, a secure and efficient FL framework with PHE by jointly exploiting contribution-aware secure aggregation and straggler-resistant client selection. Using CKKS with sparsification and blinding, FedPHE achieves efficient secure aggregation that allows clients to only provide obscured encrypted updates while the server can perform aggregation by accounting for contributions of local updates. To mitigate the straggler effect, we devise a perturbed sketch-based selection to cherry-pick representative clients with heterogeneous models and computing capabilities in a communication-efficient and privacy-preserving manner. We show, through rigorous security analysis and extensive experiments, that FedPHE can efficiently safeguard clients' privacy, achieve $2.45-6.56\times$ training speedup, cut the communication overhead by $1.32-24.85\times$, and reduce straggler effects by $1.89-2.78\times$.