Matthew J. Crossley

Matthew J. Crossley

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Matthew J. Crossley

School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 October 2015 in The Journal of Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
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JMJ. Ryan Morehead
J. Ryan Morehead
SQSalman E. Qasim
Salman E. Qasim
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley
RIRichard Ivry
Richard Ivry
Sensorimotor adaptation has traditionally been viewed as a purely error-based process. There is, however, growing appreciation for the idea that performance changes in these tasks can arise from the interplay of error-based adaptation with other learning processes. The challenge is to specify constraints on these different processes, elucidating their respective contributions to performance, as well as the manner in which they interact. We address this question by exploring constraints on savings, the phenomenon in which people show faster performance gains when the same learning task is repeated. In a series of five experiments, we demonstrate that error-based learning associated with sensorimotor adaptation does not contribute to savings. Instead, savings reflects improvements in action selection, rather than motor execution.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTSavings is the phenomenon in which people show faster relearning of a previously forgotten memory. In the motor learning domain, this phenomenon has been a puzzle for learning models that operate exclusively on error-based learning processes. We demonstrate, in a series of experiments, that savings selectively reflects improvements in action selection: Participants are more adept in invoking an appropriate aiming strategy when presented with a previously experienced perturbation. Indeed, improvements in action selection appear to be the sole source of savings in visuomotor adaptation tasks. We observe no evidence of savings in implicit error-based adaptation.

1 November 2012 in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
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Journal Article
Closed access
JSJ. David Smith
J. David Smith
MBMark E. Berg
Mark E. Berg
RCRobert G. Cook
Robert G. Cook
MMMatthew S. Murphy
Matthew S. Murphy
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley
RGRandolph C. Grace
Randolph C. Grace

31 May 2016 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Closed access
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SMSamuel D. McDougle
Samuel D. McDougle
MBMatthew J. Boggess
Matthew J. Boggess
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley
DPDarius Parvin
Darius Parvin
RIRichard B. Ivry
Richard B. Ivry
JTJordan A. Taylor
Jordan A. Taylor
Significance: Thorndike's Law of Effect states that when an action leads to a desirable outcome, that action is likely to be repeated. However, when an action is not rewarded, the brain must solve a credit assignment problem: Was the lack of reward attributable to a bad decision or poor action execution? In a series of experiments, we find that salient motor error signals modulate biases in a simple decision-making task. This effect is independent of the participant’s sense of control, suggesting that the error information impacts behavior in an implicit and automatic manner. We describe computational models of reinforcement learning in which execution error signals influence, or gate, the updating of value representations, providing a novel solution to the credit assignment problem.

1 June 2011 in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
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Journal Article
Closed access
FAF. Gregory Ashby
F. Gregory Ashby
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley
An essential component of skill acquisition is learning the environmental conditions in which that skill is relevant. This article proposes and tests a neurobiologically detailed theory of how such learning is mediated. The theory assumes that a key component of this learning is provided by the cholinergic interneurons in the striatum known as tonically active neurons (TANs). The TANs are assumed to exert a tonic inhibitory influence over cortical inputs to the striatum that prevents the execution of any striatal-dependent actions. The TANs learn to pause in rewarding environments, and this pause releases the striatal output neurons from this inhibitory effect, thereby facilitating the learning and expression of striatal-dependent behaviors. When rewards are no longer available, the TANs cease to pause, which protects striatal learning from decay. A computational version of this theory accounts for a variety of single-cell recording data and some classic behavioral phenomena, including fast reacquisition after extinction.

1 January 2010 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
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Journal Article
Closed access
JSJ. David Smith
J. David Smith
MBMichael James Beran
Michael James Beran
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley
JBJoseph Boomer
Joseph Boomer
FAF. Gregory Ashby
F. Gregory Ashby
An influential theoretical perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based system of category learning from an implicit system that slowly associates different regions of perceptual space with different response outputs. This perspective was extended for the 1st time to the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans (Homo sapiens) and macaques (Macaca mulatta) learned categories composed of sine-wave gratings that varied across trials in bar width and bar orientation. The categories had either a single-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans strongly dimensionalized the stimuli and learned the rule-based task far more quickly. Six macaques showed the same performance advantage in the rule-based task. In humans, rule-based category learning is linked to explicit cognition, consciousness, and declarative reports about the contents of cognition. These results demonstrate an empirical continuity between human and nonhuman primate cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates may have some structural components of humans' capacity for explicit cognition.

28 February 2012 in WIREs Cognitive Science
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Journal Article
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FAF. Gregory Ashby
F. Gregory Ashby
MCMatthew J. Crossley
Matthew J. Crossley