Rohit Konda

Rohit Konda

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Rohit Konda

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 June 2020 in IEEE Control Systems Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
AAAaron D. Ames
Aaron D. Ames
SCSamuel Coogan
Samuel Coogan
Verifying set invariance has classical solutions stemming from the seminal work by Nagumo, and defining sets via a smooth barrier function constraint inequality results in computable flow conditions for guaranteeing set invariance. While a majority of these historic results on set invariance consider flow conditions on the boundary, this letter fully characterizes set invariance through minimal barrier functions by directly appealing to a comparison result to define a flow condition over the entire domain of the system. A considerable benefit of this approach is the removal of regularity assumptions of the barrier function. This letter also outlines necessary and sufficient conditions for a valid differential inequality condition, giving the minimum conditions for this type of approach. We also show when minimal barrier functions are necessary and sufficient for set invariance.

8 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
RCRahul Chandan
Rahul Chandan
DGDavid Grimsman
David Grimsman
JMJason R. Marden
Jason R. Marden
Designing fast, distributed algorithms for multi-agent problems is vital for many novel application domains. Greedy algorithms have been shown in many multi-agent contexts to be an efficient approach to arrive at good solutions quickly. In this work, we ask the following: Is there any way to improve the performance of greedy algorithms without sacrificing the linear run-time guarantees? For this, we take inspiration from incentive design in the game-theoretic literature. In this work, we consider a modified version of the greedy algorithm where agents do not optimize against the global objective. Instead, each agent is prescribed an auxiliary utility function (which may differ from the original objective function) in which it optimizes under. By designing the utility functions properly, we show in this work that the resulting performance guarantees of the greedy algorithm can increase significantly. We study this approach in the context of resource-allocation games, which are used to model a rich variety of engineering applications. Interestingly, the performance guarantees from the modified greedy algorithm can be significantly close to the best centralized performance guarantees. The main technical contribution of the paper is the characterization of the performance guarantees through a linear program construction.

1 August 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
ESEric Squires
Eric Squires
PPPietro Pierpaoli
Pietro Pierpaoli
MEMagnus Egerstedt
Magnus Egerstedt
SCSamuel Coogan
Samuel Coogan

13 December 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
RCRahul Chandan
Rahul Chandan
JMJason R. Marden
Jason R. Marden
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model agents as players in a game, and predict the emergent behavior through the relevant Nash equilibria. The virtue from this viewpoint is that by assuming that self-interested decision-making processes lead to Nash equilibrium, system behavior can then be captured by Nash equilibrium without studying the decision-making processes explicitly. This approach has seen success in a wide variety of domains, such as sensor coverage, traffic networks, auctions, and network coordination. However, in many other problem settings, Nash equilibria are not necessarily guaranteed to exist or emerge from self-interested processes. Thus the main focus of the paper is on the study of sink equilibria, which are defined as the attractors of these decision-making processes. By classifying system outcomes through a global objective function, we can analyze the resulting approximation guarantees that sink equilibria have for a given game. Our main result is an approximation guarantee on the sink equilibria through defining an introduced metric of misalignment, which captures how uniform agents are in their self-interested decision making. Overall, sink equilibria are naturally occurring in many multi-agent contexts, and we display our results on their quality with respect to two practical problem settings.

25 July 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
RCRahul Chandan
Rahul Chandan
DGDavid Grimsman
David Grimsman
JMJason R. Marden
Jason R. Marden
Deriving competitive, distributed solutions to multi-agent problems is cruncial for many developing application domains; Game theory has emerged as a useful framework to design such algorithms. However, much of the attention within this framework is on the study of equilibrium behavior, whereas transient behavior is often ignored. Therefore, in this paper we study the transient efficiency guarantees of best response processes in the context of submodular resource allocation games, which find application in various engineering contexts. Specifically, the main focus of this paper is on characterizing the optimal short-term system-level behavior under the best-response process. Interestingly, the resulting transient performance guarantees are relatively close to the optimal asymptotic performance guarantees. Furthermore, we characterize the trade-offs that result when optimizing for both asymptotic and transient efficiency through various utility designs.

14 December 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RKRohit Konda
Rohit Konda
RCRahul Chandan
Rahul Chandan
JMJason R. Marden
Jason R. Marden
In recent years, a significant research effort has been devoted to the design of distributed protocols for the control of multi-agent systems, as the scale and limited communication bandwidth characteristic of such systems render centralized control impossible. Given the strict operating conditions, it is unlikely that every agent in a multi-agent system will have local information that is consistent with the true system state. Yet, the majority of works in the literature assume that agents share perfect knowledge of their environment. This paper focuses on understanding the impact that inconsistencies in agents’ local information can have on the performance of multi-agent systems. More specifically, we consider the design of multi-agent operations under a game theoretic lens where individual agents are assigned utilities that guide their local decision making. We provide a tractable procedure for designing utilities that optimize the efficiency of the resulting collective behavior (i.e., price of anarchy) for classes of set covering games where the extent of the information inconsistencies is known. In the setting where the extent of the informational inconsistencies is not known, we show – perhaps surprisingly – that underestimating the level of uncertainty leads to better price of anarchy than overestimating it.