23 March 2016 in African Affairs
How does decentralization affect patronage and rent seeking? While centralization is seen as enabling these practices, many expect decentralization to reduce them. With few examples of meaningful reform it is difficult to establish if this is the case in the context of African states. We look at the impact of decentralization on rent seeking and patronage in Kenya, where the devolution of significant powers to county governments has recently taken place. We suggest that devolution has not removed these practices but rather brought them down to the local level in response to popular expectations that it is “everyone's turn to eat”. The realization of this expectation for a broad constituency of ethnic groups and elites has facilitated – so far – the embedding of these reforms. Our findings thus suggest that the implementation of meaningful decentralization has been achieved via the decentralization of patronage networks, meaning that the “our turn to eat” character of ethnic patronage politics persists. As a result, although a greater number of groups now have their turn, ethnic minorities within some counties feel marginalized, including certain trapped minorities from politically relevant groups.
2 January 2014 in Journal of Eastern African Studies
For the first time on 4 March 2013, Kenyans voted for county governors. Devolution has significantly changed fiscal and administrative organization, but has it led to changes in politics? Has it enabled the emergence of new elites, the entrenchment of old ones or rebalanced power between the counties and the centre? These issues are explored, by asking, first, whether gubernatorial candidates were ‘insiders’ who had held public office before, or ‘outsiders’, and whether they were locals or not; and second, how national forces impacted on the gubernatorial campaigns. These questions are answered using original primary data on four counties: Nakuru, Kiambu, Mombasa and Kilifi, and aggregated data from all 47 counties. We find that the majority of winning candidates were ‘insiders’ who won using existing patronage networks, suggesting that the gubernatorial elections led to the entrenchment of existing elites and patronage networks. However, the lack of involvement of national leaders in crucial party primaries allowed for the emergence of powerful local insiders who may challenge national elites going forward. Overall, the first chapter of devolution reflected existing political dynamics in Kenya more than it changed them, although challenges to the resilience of national elites are clear.
19 March 2019 in Journal of Eastern African Studies
Constitutional provisions for devolution and land reform sought to address local land grievances and decentralize land administration in ways that would prevent conflict. The article argues that partial implementation of this agenda has intensified local grievances in a context of enduring national control over land administration. Local grievances have intensified as devolution has empowered majority communities and stoked their attachment to homelands, while the constitutional recognition of ancestral land rights has provided them with a legal basis for their claims. The failed decentralization of land administration has left national institutions as the focus of these claims. We examine whether these trends affected the use of land as a political resource and the rhetoric of land grievance during the 2017 elections. Using regression analysis, we find that titles were used patrimonially in the presidential elections, with titles targeted at Kikuyu minorities outside of their homelands. Our qualitative analysis suggests that the rhetoric of land grievances was limited in gubernatorial campaigns, suggesting that continued centralization in land administration retains the focus of land issues at the national level. Overall, our findings suggest that the partial implementation of the Constitution has exacerbated the conditions that led to land-based conflict in the past.
1 February 2018 in European Journal of Political Research
14 June 2023 in Journal of Institutional Economics
The arguments that property rights and taxation positively affect development are well established in separate literatures, but the link between property rights and taxation is under-studied. To address this gap, we theorize, in the fiscal contract tradition, that property rights assigned and upheld by the state, as opposed to other political authorities, increase individual assent to taxation. We apply this argument to property rights on land in sub-Saharan-Africa, where the majority of land is governed by traditional authorities. Empirically we examine (1) the link between the state-assinged property rights on land and assent to taxation using individual-level data from Afrobarometer, and (2) the effect of state-led formalization, measured through novel data on state-produced cadastral records, and revenue from taxes on individuals in a panel of 37 sub-Saharan African countries across 35 years. We find support for our argument that there is no taxation without state-assigned property rights.