Agnes Cornell

Agnes Cornell

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 March 2016 in African Affairs
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MDMichelle D'Arcy
Michelle D'Arcy
ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
How does decentralization affect patronage and rent seeking? While centralization is seen as enabling these practices, many expect decentralization to reduce them. With few examples of meaningful reform it is difficult to establish if this is the case in the context of African states. We look at the impact of decentralization on rent seeking and patronage in Kenya, where the devolution of significant powers to county governments has recently taken place. We suggest that devolution has not removed these practices but rather brought them down to the local level in response to popular expectations that it is “everyone's turn to eat”. The realization of this expectation for a broad constituency of ethnic groups and elites has facilitated – so far – the embedding of these reforms. Our findings thus suggest that the implementation of meaningful decentralization has been achieved via the decentralization of patronage networks, meaning that the “our turn to eat” character of ethnic patronage politics persists. As a result, although a greater number of groups now have their turn, ethnic minorities within some counties feel marginalized, including certain trapped minorities from politically relevant groups.

12 April 2020 in Comparative Political Studies
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ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
JTJan Teorell
Jan Teorell
We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large-N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable us to move beyond the problematic cross-country correlations used in previous studies. Hence, we conduct tests that control for country-specific characteristics while ensuring sufficient variation on the slow-moving bureaucracy variables to enable precise estimation. Our analysis suggests that previous cross-country regressions have vastly overstated the strength of the relationship. While this casts uncertainty on the proposition that there is an effect of Weberian bureaucracy on growth, our further analysis suggests that—if an effect exists—it may operate in the short term and be stronger in recent decades.

2 January 2014 in Journal of Eastern African Studies
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ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
MDMichelle D'ARcy
Michelle D'ARcy
For the first time on 4 March 2013, Kenyans voted for county governors. Devolution has significantly changed fiscal and administrative organization, but has it led to changes in politics? Has it enabled the emergence of new elites, the entrenchment of old ones or rebalanced power between the counties and the centre? These issues are explored, by asking, first, whether gubernatorial candidates were ‘insiders’ who had held public office before, or ‘outsiders’, and whether they were locals or not; and second, how national forces impacted on the gubernatorial campaigns. These questions are answered using original primary data on four counties: Nakuru, Kiambu, Mombasa and Kilifi, and aggregated data from all 47 counties. We find that the majority of winning candidates were ‘insiders’ who won using existing patronage networks, suggesting that the gubernatorial elections led to the entrenchment of existing elites and patronage networks. However, the lack of involvement of national leaders in crucial party primaries allowed for the emergence of powerful local insiders who may challenge national elites going forward. Overall, the first chapter of devolution reflected existing political dynamics in Kenya more than it changed them, although challenges to the resilience of national elites are clear.

10 November 2014 in Democratization
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ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
VLVictor Lapuente
Victor Lapuente
This paper presents a hypothesis for understanding democratic stability based on the distinction between politicized and meritocratic bureaucracies. We argue that in a politicized administration, the professional careers of large numbers of government officials depend directly upon which party wins the elections. This increases the likelihood that the government will take opportunistic actions aimed at surviving in office at any cost; that is, benefiting core supporters at the expense of other groups. In turn, this may foster pre-emptive actions from the opposition, such as military coups. Conversely, in democracies with meritocratic administrations, incumbents are credibly constrained from undertaking partial policies because their hands are tied in terms of managing the staff policy of the state apparatus. Consequently, countries with meritocratic bureaucracies have greater prospects for democratic stability. Empirically, we illustrate the mechanisms with two well-documented cases of democratic transitions that enshrined a politicized administration – Spain (1876–1936) and Venezuela (1958–1998) – and one transition that kept a meritocratic bureaucracy, Spain (1975–).

2 May 2017 in Governance
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FBFrida Boräng
Frida Boräng
ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
MGMarcia Grimes
Marcia Grimes
CSChristian Schuster
Christian Schuster