Christopher Kiekintveld

Christopher Kiekintveld

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Christopher Kiekintveld

University of Texas at El Paso

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
7 December 2022 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SRShanto Roy
Shanto Roy
NSNazia Sharmin
Nazia Sharmin
JAJaime C. Acosta
Jaime C. Acosta
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld
ALAron Laszka
Aron Laszka
Adversaries are often able to penetrate networks and compromise systems by exploiting vulnerabilities in people and systems. The key to the success of these attacks is information that adversaries collect throughout the phases of the cyber kill chain. We summarize and analyze the methods, tactics, and tools that adversaries use to conduct reconnaissance activities throughout the attack process. First, we discuss what types of information adversaries seek and how and when they can obtain this information. Then, we provide a taxonomy and detailed overview of adversarial reconnaissance techniques. The taxonomy introduces a categorization of reconnaissance techniques based on the source as third-party and human-, and system-based information gathering. This article provides a comprehensive view of adversarial reconnaissance that can help in understanding and modeling this complex but vital aspect of cyber attacks as well as insights that can improve defensive strategies, such as cyber deception.

12 December 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld
JMJanusz Marecki
Janusz Marecki
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
Introduction Stackelberg games are increasingly important for informing real-world decision making, including a growing body of work that applies these techniques in security domains such as critical infrastructure protection (Bier, 2007; Sandler and D. G. A. M., 2003), computer networks (Alpcan and Basar, 2003; Nguyen and Basar 2009), and robot patrolling strategies (Agmon et al., 2009; Basilico, Gatti, and Amigoni, 2009; Gatti, 2008). Two software systems that use this type of game modeling are in use by the the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) (Pita et al., 2008) and the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) (Tsai et al., 2009) to assist with resource allocation decision. A key issue that has arisen in these applications is whether the models can accurately represent the uncertainty that domain experts have about the inputs used to construct the game models, including the preferences and capabilities of terrorist adversaries. To apply game-theoretic reasoning, the first step in the analysis is to construct a precise game model. The typical approach (e.g., in the LAX and FAMS applications) is to construct a model using a combination of the available data and expert opinions. Unfortunately, the data is often limited or imprecise, especially in regard to information about the terrorist adversaries. For example, it can be difficult to predict precisely how attackers will weigh casualties, economic consequences, media exposure, and other factors when selecting targets.



12 December 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
JTJason Tsai
Jason Tsai
SRShyamsunder Rathi
Shyamsunder Rathi
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld
FOFernando Ordóñez
Fernando Ordóñez
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
Introduction Transportation networks such as buses, trains, and airplanes carry millions of people per day and from to their destinations, making them a prime target for terrorists and extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies to protect. In 2001, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City with commercial airliners resulted in $27.2 billion of direct short term costs (Looney 2002) as well as a government-reported 2,974 lives lost. The 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings resulted in 191 lives lost, 1755 people wounded, and an estimated cost of 212 million Euros (Blanco et al., 2007). Finally, in the 2005 London subway and bus bombings, 52 innocent lives were lost, 700 others were injured, and the estimated economic cost was 2 billion pounds (Thornton, 2005). In addition to preboarding security checkpoints patrols aboard the vehicles are another key defensive measure used by many organizations in these domains (Billante, 2003; Kenney, 1989). In all these networks, there are hundreds or thousands of vehicles to protect, making it difficult to create patrol schedules. Furthermore, since motivated aggressors will attempt to observe law-enforcement patterns and try to exploit the schedule, law-enforcement organizations have embraced the use of randomization in their scheduling practices. Also, in all these networks, it is not possible to simply assign law-enforcement personnel to vehicles in isolation, without considering the route the vehicle takes as well as departure and arrival times.

1 September 2021 in Computers in Human Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DJDaniel N. Jones Nelson Daniel N. Jones
Daniel N. Jones Nelson Daniel N. Jones
EPEdgar Padilla
Edgar Padilla
SCShelby R. Curtis
Shelby R. Curtis
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld