Tianming Yan

Tianming Yan

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Tianming Yan

State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University, and Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security, and School of Cyber Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, and College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 May 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TYTianming Yan
Tianming Yan
Kun YangKun Yang
Kun Yang
HTHongliang Tian
Hongliang Tian
SYShoumeng Yan
Shoumeng Yan
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
RISC-V’s open architecture provides an ideal platform for customizable security features, particularly in trusted execution environments (TEEs). However, existing RISC-V TEEs such as Keystone adopt a monolithic model where applications run with all dependencies in a single isolation domain, leading to bloated trusted computing bases (TCBs). When trusted applications grow large, vulnerabilities in any third-party library can compromise the entire enclave’s security. To address these challenges, we propose Keystone-Vault, which enables fine-grained isolation within RISC-V enclaves. Keystone-Vault reimplements and improves the Donky memory protection key mechanism and introduces a hardware-software co-designed isolation framework. The core idea is to partition each enclave into multiple regions, called Vaults, to isolate specific portions of code and data with hardware-assisted access control. Mean-while, our lightweight vault-switching mechanism runs entirely in user mode, making it more lightweight than existing RISC-V TEE designs that rely on Physical Memory Protection (PMP) to enforce security-domain partitioning. Proof-of-concept (PoC) experiments based on a prototype of Keystone-Vault implemented on the QEMU emulation platform demonstrate that Keystone-Vault successfully defends against attacks from a malicious OS and confines security risks from untrusted libraries within their respective vaults. Evaluation on realistic and complex workloads further demonstrates that, compared with baseline Keystone, Keystone-Vault introduces only 3%–7% additional performance overhead.