Kun Yang

Prof. Kun Yang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 July 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JXJunge Xu
Junge Xu
FZFan Zhang
Fan Zhang
WJWenguang Jin
Wenguang Jin
Kun YangKun Yang
Kun Yang
ZWZeke Wang
Zeke Wang
YHYajun Ha
Yajun Ha
With increasing computation of various applications, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is gradually deployed on FPGAs to improve performance and save energy. However, its reliability and security have not been sufficiently evaluated, which incurs quite many concerns. In this article, we propose an evaluation framework for deep investigation of stealthy DVFS fault injection attacks on the state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) deployed on modern FPGAs. The evaluation framework mainly consists of a DVFS attack striker and a time-to-digital converter (TDC)-based hardware profiler. Two modes of evaluation are derived, and their effectiveness is demonstrated on a platform composed of a SkyNet accelerator and three ImageNet models built on a Xilinx deep learning processor unit (DPU). Experimental results show that more than 99% detection accuracy loss can be measured targeting at all tested DNN models under prospective operation mode but without any performance degradation in frame per second (FPS). In our investigation of sensitive layer mode, more than 93% average accuracy loss with 84.7% fault probability can be measured on a single bundle of the SkyNet. We characterize the vulnerabilities of different DNN layers subject to DVFS attacks through leveraging the TDC-based hardware profiler to precisely control the timing of fault injection.

19 June 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QWQianmei Wu
Qianmei Wu
FZFan Zhang
Fan Zhang
SGShize Guo
Shize Guo
Kun YangKun Yang
Kun Yang
HSHaoting Shen
Haoting Shen
As a common defense against side-channel attacks, random delay insertion introduces noise into the executive flow of encryption, which increases attack complexity. Accordingly, various techniques are exploited to mitigate the defense effect of such insertions. As an advanced mathematical technique, wavelet analysis is considered to be a more effective technology according to its detailed and comprehensive interpretation of signals. In this paper, we propose a unified and fully automated wavelet-based attack framework (denoted as UWAF ), whose data processing is kept within one unified wavelet domain, with three enhanced components: denoising, alignment and key extraction. We put forward a new idea of combining machine learning with wavelet analysis to realize the full automation of the program for attack framework, rendering it possible to search exhaustively for the optimal combination of parameter settings in wavelet transform. Our proposal finds a new setting of wavelet parameters that have not been exploited ever before and achieves the performance enhancement for about 20 times fewer traces required for successful key recovery. UWAF is compared with several mainstream attack frameworks. Experimental results show that it outperforms those counterparts, and can be considered as an effective framework-level solution to defeat the countermeasure of random delay insertion.

23 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZCZhiyuan Chen
Zhiyuan Chen
Kun YangKun Yang
Kun Yang
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
Fault injection attacks (FIAs) are a class of active physical attacks that inject faults into computing devices to deliberately change their intended behaviors for malicious purposes such as security feature circumvention, privilege escalation, secret data extraction by analyzing the erroneous outputs, etc. Existing sensors that detect fault injection attacks are either susceptible to aging or suffer from complicated and costly calibration process. Worse still, most sensors will fail in the presence of dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) because they are built upon fixed delay chains and cannot adapt to operating voltage and frequency variations. In this paper, we overcome these limitations by presenting CDS, a delay chain based digital sensor that exploits timing variations of both detector and protected object for detecting multiple types of fault injection attacks. CDS utilizes a calibration module to solve the accuracy degradation caused by aging phenomena and a dynamic adjustment module to acclimatize itself to the need of dynamically adjusting voltage according to operating frequency in the presence of DVFS. To demonstrate its capability, we use CDS to protect the hardware accelerator of PRESENT cryptographic algorithm against voltage and laser glitching attacks. Simulation results based on HSPICE show that (i) CDS can detect 100% of voltage and temperature coordinated glitching attacks with 4.1% early warning; (ii) CDS can detect 100% of laser glitching attacks with 9.1% early warning; (iii) CDS maintains outstanding aging resistance with only 1.1% false alarm rate increase after 7 years of use.

4 May 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TYTianming Yan
Tianming Yan
Kun YangKun Yang
Kun Yang
HTHongliang Tian
Hongliang Tian
SYShoumeng Yan
Shoumeng Yan
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
RISC-V’s open architecture provides an ideal platform for customizable security features, particularly in trusted execution environments (TEEs). However, existing RISC-V TEEs such as Keystone adopt a monolithic model where applications run with all dependencies in a single isolation domain, leading to bloated trusted computing bases (TCBs). When trusted applications grow large, vulnerabilities in any third-party library can compromise the entire enclave’s security. To address these challenges, we propose Keystone-Vault, which enables fine-grained isolation within RISC-V enclaves. Keystone-Vault reimplements and improves the Donky memory protection key mechanism and introduces a hardware-software co-designed isolation framework. The core idea is to partition each enclave into multiple regions, called Vaults, to isolate specific portions of code and data with hardware-assisted access control. Mean-while, our lightweight vault-switching mechanism runs entirely in user mode, making it more lightweight than existing RISC-V TEE designs that rely on Physical Memory Protection (PMP) to enforce security-domain partitioning. Proof-of-concept (PoC) experiments based on a prototype of Keystone-Vault implemented on the QEMU emulation platform demonstrate that Keystone-Vault successfully defends against attacks from a malicious OS and confines security risks from untrusted libraries within their respective vaults. Evaluation on realistic and complex workloads further demonstrates that, compared with baseline Keystone, Keystone-Vault introduces only 3%–7% additional performance overhead.