Balasingham Balachandran

Balasingham Balachandran

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Balasingham Balachandran

La Trobe University - School of Economics and Finance; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2018 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
JNJustin Hung Nguyen
Justin Hung Nguyen

14 September 2018 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
HDHuu Nhan Duong
Huu Nhan Duong
VVVan Hoang Vu
Van Hoang Vu
We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.

1 February 2019 in Journal of Corporate Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
AKArifur Khan
Arifur Khan
PMPaul Mather
Paul Mather
MTMichael Theobald
Michael Theobald

29 May 2020 in European Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMd Al Mamun
Md Al Mamun
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
HDHuu Nhan Duong
Huu Nhan Duong
FGFerdinand A Gul
Ferdinand A Gul
We find that firms with a top management counsel (TMC) have lower stock price crash risk than other firms. We further show that firms with a TMC issue more negative relative to positive earnings guidance and use more negative relative to positive words in their annual report filings, compared to firms without a TMC. TMCs are more effective in mitigating crash risk when they serve on the board. Our findings support the monitoring role of TMCs in mitigating bad news hoarding, which, in turn, contributes to the reduction in crash risk.

14 November 2011 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
RFRobert Faff
Robert Faff
MTMichael Theobald
Michael Theobald
TZTony van Zijl
Tony van Zijl
We examine the role of shareholder takeup in rights offerings on the subscription period price reaction and liquidity. Our results indicate that takeup information is reflected in price adjustments over the subscription period and that quality-related information disclosed on the rights announcement date further impacts prices in this period. Higher shareholder takeup improves liquidity. We do find some evidence of inefficiencies in the adjustment process over the subscription period that, in part, is consistent with a model where markets are characterized by overconfident investors and that also articulates with takeup information arriving in the market.

13 March 2017 in Australian Journal of Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BBBalasingham Balachandran
Balasingham Balachandran
SKSutharson Kanapathippillai
Sutharson Kanapathippillai
CKChandrasekhar Krishnamurti
Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti
MTMichael Theobald
Michael Theobald
EVEswaran Velayutham
Eswaran Velayutham
We examine the issuance choice across rights issues of equity, unit offerings, and standalone warrants and investigate the market reactions to these issue types. We find that agency costs, growth opportunities, and current funding needs relative to assets in place are prime drivers of the type of equity issuance choice. Managers use quality signals such as underpricing, underwriting status, and the proportion of funds raised by exercising warrants in determining the features of the warrant issue. Furthermore, we document that the market reacts more favorably to standalone warrants issues than units and equity during the rights offering period.