Xin Meng

Xin Meng

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Xin Meng

School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 February 2022 in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CWChao Wang
Chao Wang
XMXin Meng
Xin Meng
MGMingxue Guo
Mingxue Guo
HLHao Li
Hao Li
ZHZhiqiang Hou
Zhiqiang Hou

20 January 2022 in Transport Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XMXin Meng
Xin Meng
MGMingxue Guo
Mingxue Guo
ZGZiyou Gao
Ziyou Gao
ZYZhenzhen Yang
Zhenzhen Yang
ZYZhilu Yuan
Zhilu Yuan
LKLiujiang Kang
Liujiang Kang
To verify the effects of Wuhan highway lockdown measures on the spread of COVID-19 across China cities, we extracted the vehicle outflow from Wuhan to 245 cities from the Chinese highway toll system. A dynamic exponential risk model that considered the vehicle outflow, city gross domestic product, city population, and distance between two cities was established to characterize the spread of pandemics and quantify the blocking effects. Results showed that an early highway lockdown measure could indeed reduce the confirmed cases and vehicles with 1–9 seats played a leading role. The confirmed cases in Guangxi, Henan, and Shanxi could be reduced by more than 50%, as well as Hubei by 20% if the highway was closed 3 days in advance. The blocking effects on Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, and Shandong were not obvious, where the number of confirmed cases only decreased by a small proportion (below 10%). The findings could be used to help each provincial government to adjust policies properly and improve the effectiveness of epidemic control and prevention. Moreover, the proposed method could also be applied to various countries or regions affected by COVID-19, as well as other similar pandemics.

13 October 2021 in Frontiers in Energy Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YDYijie Dou
Yijie Dou
Tong ZhangTong Zhang
Tong Zhang
XMXin Meng
Xin Meng
Subsidies and penalties are two main regulation methods adopted by authorities to promote the development of renewable energy. Due to the possibility of subsidy fraud, it is necessary to explore effective ways to combine these two policies. In this article, subsidy and penalty policies are incorporated into a sequential game theory model to explore the impact of different regulatory mechanisms on the promotion of renewable energy from recycled resources. We take biodiesel production from used cooking oil (UCO) as an example. UCO can be converted into environmentally friendly biodiesel or mixed with fresh cooking oil, resulting in inferior cooking oil containing harmful carcinogens but with huge profits. There are two mechanisms in the sequential combination model, spot checks after subsidy and subsidy after spot checks. Under both cases, fines are imposed if fraud is found during spot checks. The amounts of subsidies and fines also need to be determined. We show that the effects of subsidies depend on the implementation of the timing. The ex-ante subsidies have no effect. When spot checks are performed first, the larger subsidies will increase the probability of producing inferior cooking oil due to lower probability of spot checks. While combined with penalties, the ex-post subsidies have a positive effect on biodiesel production, that is, there exists synergy effect of penalty and subsidy on renewable energy production. In an infinitely repeated game, the shutdown threat of a grim trigger strategy (GTS) is much easier to induce biodiesel production than the penalty threat of a tit-for-tat strategy (TFT). When penalties are large enough, TFT can achieve the same goal of legal production effectively as GTS. The sooner illegal production is observed, the lower penalties are required to induce the processor to produce legally. Compared to subsidies, penalties are more effective in encouraging processors to produce renewable energy rather than illegal products. Moreover, our simulation results suggest that higher fines or profits from legal production are more likely to stimulate renewable energy production than subsidies. Our findings enrich our knowledge of the link between government regulations and the promotion of renewable energy.