Iness Aguir

Iness Aguir

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Iness Aguir

University of Texas at San Antonio - Department of Finance

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 September 2023 in Journal of Financial Stability
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IAIness Aguir
Iness Aguir
NBNarjess Boubakri
Narjess Boubakri
MMMiriam Marra
Miriam Marra
LZLu Zhu
Lu Zhu

23 July 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
OAOsamah AlKhazali
Osamah AlKhazali
AMAli Mirzaei
Ali Mirzaei
IAIness Aguir
Iness Aguir
This paper examines whether fintech credit alleviates investment–cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms, particularly small firms in emerging economies. Using data from 45,770 firms over the period 2013–2020, we investigate whether the development of fintech lending markets reduces firms’ dependence on internally generated funds when financing investment expenditures. We find no significant effect of fintech financing on investment–cash flow sensitivity for the average firm. However, fintech financing significantly reduces investment–cash flow sensitivity among small firms, indicating that the benefits of fintech development are concentrated among firms facing greater financing constraints. Additional analyses show that the effect is stronger among young firms and firms operating in industries with greater external financing needs. Furthermore, our results reveal that the reduction in investment–cash flow sensitivity is primarily driven by peer-to-peer (P2P) lending and other alternative fintech lending channels, rather than by balance-sheet lending or crowdfunding. Overall, the findings suggest that fintech financing can improve capital allocation efficiency in emerging economies by alleviating financing constraints and expanding access to external finance for underserved firms.

23 November 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
IAIness Aguir
Iness Aguir
NBNatasha Burns
Natasha Burns
SMSattar Mansi
Sattar Mansi
John WaldJohn Wald
John Wald
We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability protection. Examining takeovers, we find evidence that takeovers of firms with protected directors are less likely to succeed. Moreover, firms with protected directors are more likely to accept a lower bid premium, and this finding is consistent with protected directors having reduced incentives to negotiate for the highest possible price during the acquisition. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that director liability provisions have a significant impact both on director compensation and director duty.