1 July 2023 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: Gig economy companies benefit from labor flexibility by hiring independent workers in response to real-time demand. However, workers’ flexibility in their work schedule poses a great challenge in terms of planning and committing to a service capacity. Understanding what motivates gig economy workers is thus of great importance. In collaboration with a ride-hailing platform, we study how on-demand workers make labor decisions; specifically, whether to work and work duration. Our model revisits competing theories of labor supply regarding the impact of financial incentives and behavioral motives on labor decisions. We are interested in both improving how to predict the behavior of flexible workers and understanding how to design better incentives. Methodology/results: Using a large comprehensive data set, we develop an econometric model to analyze workers’ labor decisions and responses to incentives while accounting for sample selection and endogeneity. We find that financial incentives have a significant positive influence on the decision to work and on the work duration—confirming the positive income elasticity posited by the standard income effect. We also find support for a behavioral theory as workers exhibit income-targeting behavior (working less when reaching an income goal) and inertia (working more after working for a longer period). Managerial implications: We demonstrate via numerical experiments that incentive optimization based on our insights can increase service capacity by 22% without incurring additional cost, or maintain the same capacity at a 30% lower cost. Ignoring behavioral factors could lead to understaffing by 10%–17% below the optimal capacity level. Lastly, our insights inform the design of platform strategy to manage flexible workers amidst an intensified competition among gig platforms. Funding: This study was supported by The Jay H. Baker Retailing Center, The William and Phyllis Mack Institute for Innovation Management, The Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, and The Fishman-Davidson Center for Service and Operations Management. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1191 .
1 January 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
In the last few years, we have seen the emergence of two new ways in which firms interact with outside stakeholders, namely crowdsourcing and crowdfunding service providers. In this article, we define crowdsourcing and crowdfunding terms, compare new business models with traditional ones, review the operations management research community’s contribution so far, point out useful frameworks for understanding the phenomena, illuminate promising research paths, and highlight open research questions. We also discuss the parallels between these concepts as well the main differences.
1 December 2021 in Management Science
We explore whether customers are loss averse in time and how delay information may impact such reference-dependent behavior using observational and field experiment data from two call centers of an Israeli bank. We consider settings with no announcements and announcements of different accuracy levels. We face two key challenges: (1) we do not observe the reference points customers use in our data, as any other field studies, and (2) it is difficult to separate the reference-dependent behavior from the potential nonlinear waiting cost of customers. To address these challenges, we develop a dynamic decision model with consumer learning, through which we infer the reference point each customer used during any given call. The reference points may be different across different customers and evolve across different calls of the same customers. We also exclude the alternative explanation by showing that our main reference-dependent models better explain the observed customer abandonment than models where customers have nonlinear waiting cost. Our results indicate that customers are loss averse regardless of the availability or accuracy of the announcements when their waiting time is relatively long (≥ 90s). Although delay announcements do not alter the nature that customers are loss averse, accurate announcements may affect customers’ belief about the offered waiting time and thus, impact the reference points. Through counterfactual studies, we demonstrate that providing delay announcements improves the call center performance given the loss aversion behavior observed in our data. Interestingly, as customers become more loss averse, the value of providing delay announcements decreases. This paper was accepted by Terry Taylor, operations management.
1 June 2022 in Management Science
Lean and agile models of product development organize the flexible capacity to rapidly update individual products in response to customer feedback. Although agile operations have been adopted across numerous industries, neither the benefits nor the factors explaining when firms choose to become agile are validated and understood. We study these questions using data on the development of mobile apps, which occurs through the dynamic release of new versions into the mobile app marketplace, and the apps’ customer ratings. We develop a structural model estimating the dependence of product versioning on (a) market feedback in the form of customer ratings against (b) project and work-based considerations, such as development timelines, scale economies, and operational constraints. In contrast to when they actually benefit from operational agility, firms become agile when launching riskier products (in terms of uncertainty in initial customer reception) and less agile when they are able to exploit scale economies from coordinating development over a portfolio of apps. Agile operations increase firm payoffs by margins of 20% to 80%, and interestingly, partial agility is often sufficient to capture the bulk of these returns. Finally, turning to a question of marketplace design, we study how the mobile app marketplace should design the display of ratings to incentivize quality (increasing app categories’ average user satisfaction rates by as much as 22%). This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.
1 March 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: Customers are likely to initiate retrial calls when their previous contact with a call center fails to deliver a satisfactory resolution. According to industry reports, retrials are listed as a top annoying issue for customers and hurt call centers’ profits. Though recognizing this problem, call centers find it challenging to reduce retrials without overshooting their operating expenses. Our research aims to empirically understand the mechanism of customer retrials and then provide economically feasible solutions to reduce retrials. Academic/practical relevance: Little empirical research has been done to understand customers’ strategic retrials, and theoretical research studies retrials by assuming the degree to which pickup speed and service quality impact retrials. Our research empirically investigates the mechanism of customer retrials by studying whether speed and quality truly matter and, if so, how strong the impact is from each of them and whether the impacts are different across various customer segments. The quantified mechanism can then guide service providers to reduce retrials cost-effectively. Methodology: We use a random-coefficient dynamic structural model to characterize customer decisions in pursuing a satisfactory resolution and estimate the parameters from call-by-call records of a uniquely designed call center. Our model tracks customer decisions in the online waiting stage, in which customers are waiting for an agent but weighing whether to abandon, and in the off-line waiting stage, in which customers are not directly connected but are actively debating whether to retry. Utilizing the hybrid system that sequentially places customers into queues for three distinct quality service groups, we disentangle the effects of pickup speed and service quality on customers’ abandonment and retrial decisions. Results: Our estimations confirm that high service quality and quick pickup speed reduce retrials. Moreover, we discover that private customers are more sensitive to quality but less sensitive to speed compared with business customers. We suggest two service designs to reduce retrials cost-effectively by tailoring services to customer preferences. One reallocates the service groups for different customer segments without expanding the system, and the other adjusts the staffing ratios by hiring low-cost, ordinary-quality agents. Under the two tailoring designs, business customer surplus increases by up to 14.4% and private customer surplus by up to 14.9%. Managerial implications: First, our research highlights the importance of recognizing customers’ off-line decisions, which are impacted by online service offerings and, in turn, affect future online service operations. Neglecting customer retrials leads to suboptimal service designs. Second, by understanding the mechanism of customer retrials empirically, our research guides call centers to reduce retrials cost-effectively with speed–quality balance. Third, our research develops a practical analysis framework for service providers to quantify customer preferences and design tailoring services.
30 August 2011 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Motivated by airline baggage fees, we consider a service provider offering a main service (e.g., transporting a person) and an ancillary service (e.g., transporting a checked bag) that an individual customer may or may not need. We ask whether the firm should bundle the two services and post a single price or unbundle them and price the ancillary service separately. We consider two motivations for unbundling the services. The first focuses on altering consumer behavior to lower the firm’s costs. We assume that providing the ancillary service is costly but consumers can exert effort in order to reduce the rate at which the ancillary service is needed. We show that the firm unbundles and sets the fee for the ancillary service at the same level the social planner would. Profit maximization thus results in social efficiency. The second rationale for unbundling is segmentation. We assume that there are two segments that differ in the rate at which they use the ancillary service. The optimal contracts impose higher ancillary service fees on those less likely to use the service. In the airline setting, this would imply that business travelers would face higher baggage fees than leisure travelers. We conclude that the way in which airlines have implemented baggage fees is more consistent with attempts to control consumer behavior than segment customers.