Problem definition: Blockchain is a form of distributed ledger technology. While it has grown in prominence, its full potential and possible downsides are not fully understood yet, especially with respect to operations management (OM). Academic/practical relevance: This article fills this gap. Methodology: After briefly reviewing the technical foundations, we explore multiple business and policy aspects. Results: We identify five key strengths, the corresponding five main weaknesses, and three research themes of applying blockchain technology to OM. The key strengths are (1) visibility, (2) aggregation, (3) validation, (4) automation, and (5) resiliency. The corresponding weaknesses are (1) lack of privacy, (2) lack of standardization, (3) garbage in, garbage out, (4) black box effect, and (5) inefficiency. The three research themes are (1) information, (2) automation, and (3) tokenization. Managerial implications: We illustrate these research themes with multiple promising research problems, ranging from classical inventory management, to new areas of ethical OM, and to questions of industrial organization.
Using a panel of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and supply chain links, we observe that both favorable and unfavorable credit shocks propagate through supply chains in the CDS market. Particularly, the three-day cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC) is 63 basis points for firms whose customers experienced a CDS up-jump event (an adverse credit shock). The value is 74 basis points if their suppliers experienced a CDS up-jump event. The corresponding three-day CASC values are –36 and –38 basis points, respectively, for firms whose customers and suppliers, respectively, experienced an extreme CDS down-jump event (a favorable credit shock). These effects are approximately twice as large for adverse credit shocks originating from natural disasters. Credit shock propagation is absent in inactive supply chains and is amplified if supply chain partners are followed by the same analysts. Industry competition and financial linkages between supply chain partners, such as trade credit and large sales exposure, amplify the shock propagation along supply chains. Strong shock propagation persists through second and third supply chain tiers for adverse shocks but attenuates for favorable shocks. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.
1 February 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Interface of finance, operations, and risk management (iFORM) is a relatively new research area dealing with timely, complex, and boundary-spanning issues in a variety of settings from start-ups to global enterprises. iFORM research addresses ways to better integrate physical, financial, and informational flows by combining the operational choices of the firm with its financial decisions, and merging information flows between the firm and its customers and suppliers with informational flows between the firm and its investors. We report on the main research themes of the recent iFORM research, based on, and going beyond, papers that appeared in the Manufacturing and Service Operations Management iFORM special issue. We highlight the main emerging contributions in the area. Among the most frequently addressed issues in current research include the following: supply chain finance, such as trade credit and buyer-intermediated finance and their effects on supply chain performance; agency problems, such as risk shifting and managerial short-termism and their influence on operational decisions; contracting between the firm and its investors and how it alters contracting with supply chain partners; and supply risk management in the form of dealing with commodity price fluctuations and supplier performance issues. We suggest four promising directions of future iFORM research: supply chain finance, integrated risk management, start-up and entrepreneurial financing, and asset pricing with supply chains.
1 November 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: Governments have adopted various subsidy policies to promote investment in renewable energy sources such as rooftop solar panels. The German government uses a feed-in-tariff policy that provides a guaranteed stream of payments for each unit of electricity generated by a household. In contrast, the U.S. government uses a tax-rebate policy that reduces the initial investment cost, and the household receives the retail price for the generated electricity. In this paper, we study the key practical factors that favor one policy over the other from the perspective of the government. These factors are the heterogeneity in the generating efficiency, the variability in the electricity price, and the variability in the investment cost. Academic relevance: Unlike the previous literature on the feed-in-tariff and tax-rebate policies, we focus on the effects of variability on a household’s investment timing. We identify the optimal policy for the government to manage the aggregate household investment, accounting for the heterogeneity in efficiency. Methodology: We consider an infinite-horizon, continuous-time model where the government moves first and announces either a feed-in tariff or a tax rebate. Then each household dynamically decides if and when to invest in a unit of solar panels. The objective of the government is to maximize the expected value of a subsidy policy, that is, the difference between the societal benefit of solar panel investments and the subsidy cost over time. Results: We characterize the timing of the investment decision of the households and the optimal subsidy parameters for the government. We identify which practical factors favor the feed-in-tariff or the tax-rebate policy. Policy implications: Our results suggest that a government should prefer the feed-in-tariff policy when the electricity price is highly uncertain. Intuitively, feed-in-tariff policy eliminates the price variability; thus, it removes the strategic delay in the investment. The tax-rebate policy should be adopted if the households are heterogeneous in generating efficiency, if the investment cost is highly variable, or if the price and cost uncertainty are positively correlated.
1 January 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
In the last few years, we have seen the emergence of two new ways in which firms interact with outside stakeholders, namely crowdsourcing and crowdfunding service providers. In this article, we define crowdsourcing and crowdfunding terms, compare new business models with traditional ones, review the operations management research community’s contribution so far, point out useful frameworks for understanding the phenomena, illuminate promising research paths, and highlight open research questions. We also discuss the parallels between these concepts as well the main differences.
1 February 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
In an industry with knowledge spillover and debt financing, equilibrium investments in research and development (R&D) projects are subject to three economic forces. First, knowledge spillover among firms enables free dissemination of new technologies and produces investment synergies. Second, knowledge spillover also causes free riding: in equilibrium, firms underinvest in R&D expecting to benefit from investments by others. Third, debt financing creates incentive for risk shifting: equity holders overinvest in riskier R&D projects. We study how interactions among these forces affect a firm’s investment decisions and equilibrium industry outcomes using a three-stage game between two firms and the external debt market. We characterize subgame perfect, Pareto-dominant equilibria and show that for some parameter choices, free riding and risk shifting cancel each other in the decisions of individual firms, resulting in the first-best investments. Interestingly, for some cases, the equilibrium with first-best investments becomes possible only when risk shifting by one firm enables free riding by the other firm. We also show that debt can be used by firms as a commitment device in a multistage game. This value of debt is shared with investors, who can earn positive profits despite being perfectly competitive. This enriches the understanding of the financial pecking order theory by showing that even firms with unlimited internal capital may prefer external debt financing.This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Issue on Interface of Finance, Operations, and Risk Management.