Abhijeet Solanki

Abhijeet Solanki

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Abhijeet Solanki

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee Technological University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
11 June 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
WAWesam Al Amiri
Wesam Al Amiri
MMMarim Mahmoud
Marim Mahmoud
BSBlaine Swieder
Blaine Swieder
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
TGTerry Guo
Terry Guo
The adoption of autonomous vehicles (AVs) significantly increased in recent years, playing a crucial role in enhancing transportation safety and efficiency, expanding mobility options, and reducing user costs. However, as AVs become more connected and automated, they also become more susceptible to malicious attacks, making it imperative to prioritize their security. Specifically, AVs are vulnerable to a range of cyber-threats, leading to a growing body of literature on potential cyberattacks targeting AVs. A key focus of existing research is understanding these threats and proposing mitigation strategies, particularly those aimed at attacks on navigational perception sensors, which are critical to AV navigation and decision-making. AVs rely on an array of navigational perception sensors, including LiDAR, cameras, RADAR, global positioning system (GPS) sensors, and ultrasonic sensors, to ensure secure and safe operation. However, adversarial manipulation of these sensors can compromise an AV’s navigational perception system, potentially leading to catastrophic consequences. While existing surveys provide valuable insights on AV cybersecurity challenges, several gaps remain unexplored, such as hardware security issues in AVs, analyzing sensor fusion attacks and evaluating practical defense implementations. To address these gaps, this paper makes a novel contribution by offering a comprehensive review of sensor fusion vulnerabilities that have not been sufficiently addressed in previous literature, specifically focusing on the compounded effects of sensor manipulation in AVs. In addition, this paper introduces a new classification of sensor vulnerabilities, highlighting practical defense mechanisms based on real-world simulation and testbed environments, a key contribution not explored in earlier works. We also introduce a detailed classification of sensor vulnerabilities, categorize the attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities, and critically assess existing countermeasures and defense mechanisms. Our study provides unique insights into the practical implementation of these countermeasures through simulations and testbeds, which have been underrepresented in prior research. This approach aims to support the development of more robust security solutions for AVs.

9 September 2025 in TechRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
WAWesam Al Amiri
Wesam Al Amiri
TGTerry N Guo
Terry N Guo
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on multi-sensor perception, particularly camera and LiDAR systems, for critical tasks such as object detection and scene understanding. However, recent studies have revealed that camera-based perception is especially vulnerable to laser-based adversarial attacks, including the Adversarial Laser Beam (AdvLB) and Adversarial Laser Spot (AdvLS). These attacks are impractical for real-time deployment as they are originally designed with iterative and dynamic configurations. In this work, we introduce and analyze a static-parameter attack strategy targeting the camera, which eliminates the need for iterative tuning while consistently degrading perception accuracy. This simplicity enables realtime feasibility, posing a practical threat to deployed AV systems. We characterize the visual artifacts introduced by such attacks using first-order statistical metrics, image filtering techniques, and machine learning-based anomaly detection. Our results show that even static laser interference can impair object recognition and disrupt camera-LiDAR sensor fusion. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that basic filters such as sharpening and Laplacian, combined with Hue, Saturation, and Value (HSV)-based contour extraction, effectively detect AdvLB artifacts. In contrast, the more subtle AdvLS perturbations require geometry-aware, adaptive detection methods. To address both, we propose and implement a lightweight, unified detection framework that integrates statistical and geometric cues. The system achieves over 90% detection accuracy with near real-time performance on the Jetson Orin Nano device.

16 February 2026 in TechRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
FKFaiq Khalid
Faiq Khalid
DPDrew Phelps
Drew Phelps
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
TGTerry Nan Guo
Terry Nan Guo
UQUvais Qidwai
Uvais Qidwai
Interpretability in deep learning is essential for understanding and improving the reliability of model behavior, particularly on edge devices deployed in safetycritical environments. Grad-CAM highlights class-relevant regions in input images and is widely used for model interpretability. However, its computational overhead limits real-time use. We address this by training a lightweight network to approximate Grad-CAM masks, which are then exploited to launch a novel, targeted sticker-pasting attack that manipulates model attention. To enable real-time adversarial testing, we train a Fully Convolutional Network (FCN-ResNet50) to segment and predict Grad-CAM hotspot regions on the fly, allowing seamless attack deployment in real-time. Our pipeline is deployed on NVIDIA Jetson Orin, where it achieves efficient segmentation and real-time attack generation with an average latency of 0.09s per attack. Experimental results across multiple stateof-the-art classifiers, including VGG16, ResNet50, ViT-B16, and EfficientNet, demonstrate significant drops in Top-1 accuracy (e.g., from 96.5% to 16.0% on ResNet50) under our targeted attacks, outperforming random sticker and patch attacks in effectiveness. Furthermore, our attack framework shows strong transferability across diverse model architectures, highlighting a broader vulnerability in saliency-guided interpretation. These findings raise concerns about the malicious use of XAI tools and emphasize the need for robust defense mechanisms in real-time, resource-constrained environments.

5 March 2026 in TechRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
TSTahmid Hasan Sakib
Tahmid Hasan Sakib
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
WAWesam Al Amiri
Wesam Al Amiri
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
SRSyed Ali Asad Rizvi
Syed Ali Asad Rizvi
TGTerry N Guo
Terry N Guo
This paper presents a real-time perception and control framework to assess adversarial image attacks on an autonomous vehicle testbed. The system integrates 2D LiDAR with a YOLOv5n-based detector in a multithreaded architecture to execute a staged multi-stop navigation routine with turns and visual alignment before each stop. Baseline experiments show reliable operation without requiring way-point information, with consistent stopping accuracy and path completion across repeated runs. Instead of using traditional digital overlays, we evaluated our testbed on adversarial patterns on a physical traffic sign. To assess vulnerability against adversarial images, specific adversarial variants of traffic signs were tested. This cause marked reductions in detection range and even missed recognitions. To restore performance without changing sensing, fusion, or control, we apply adversarial learning to fine-tune YOLOv5n. The retrained model recovers detection reliability across all variants and returns the vehicle to normal closed-loop behavior without relying on waypoint information.


8 December 2025 in TechRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
PPParth Patel
Parth Patel
FKFaiq Khalid
Faiq Khalid
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
UQUvais Qidwa
Uvais Qidwa
Collaborative deep neural network (CDNN) inference across distributed edge devices provides scalability and resilience in mission-critical scenarios. Prior research has concentrated on adversarial attacks targeting intermediate feature maps within pseudo-model-parallelism Convolutional Neural Networks (ps-CDNNs), where feature-level disturbances are relatively localized and statistically detectable. In this paper, we introduce and examine a new type of input-level slice attack, in which adversaries manipulate input image segments before entering the network pipeline. We show that such attacks are much harder to detect with traditional statistical or filter-based defenses because of their subtler effects on aggregated feature distributions. To combat this, we propose an ensemble of lightweight machine learning detectors that utilize statistical signatures from feature maps, achieving an F1 score of up to 87% while keeping a low inference overhead. Our comparative analysis across attack surfaces (input vs. intermediate) and model architectures (VGG16, ResNet18) indicates that input-level perturbations not only bypass classic defenses but also more effectively degrade accuracy in multislice settings. These findings reveal a previously underexplored vulnerability in collaborative inference frameworks and emphasize the need for adaptive, model-agnostic detection strategies at the system edge to secure artificial intelligence (AI) models.