Syed Rafay Hasan

Syed Rafay Hasan

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Syed Rafay Hasan

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 June 2025 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ASAbhijeet Solanki
Abhijeet Solanki
WAWesam Al Amiri
Wesam Al Amiri
MMMarim Mahmoud
Marim Mahmoud
BSBlaine Swieder
Blaine Swieder
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
TGTerry Guo
Terry Guo
The adoption of autonomous vehicles (AVs) significantly increased in recent years, playing a crucial role in enhancing transportation safety and efficiency, expanding mobility options, and reducing user costs. However, as AVs become more connected and automated, they also become more susceptible to malicious attacks, making it imperative to prioritize their security. Specifically, AVs are vulnerable to a range of cyber-threats, leading to a growing body of literature on potential cyberattacks targeting AVs. A key focus of existing research is understanding these threats and proposing mitigation strategies, particularly those aimed at attacks on navigational perception sensors, which are critical to AV navigation and decision-making. AVs rely on an array of navigational perception sensors, including LiDAR, cameras, RADAR, global positioning system (GPS) sensors, and ultrasonic sensors, to ensure secure and safe operation. However, adversarial manipulation of these sensors can compromise an AV’s navigational perception system, potentially leading to catastrophic consequences. While existing surveys provide valuable insights on AV cybersecurity challenges, several gaps remain unexplored, such as hardware security issues in AVs, analyzing sensor fusion attacks and evaluating practical defense implementations. To address these gaps, this paper makes a novel contribution by offering a comprehensive review of sensor fusion vulnerabilities that have not been sufficiently addressed in previous literature, specifically focusing on the compounded effects of sensor manipulation in AVs. In addition, this paper introduces a new classification of sensor vulnerabilities, highlighting practical defense mechanisms based on real-world simulation and testbed environments, a key contribution not explored in earlier works. We also introduce a detailed classification of sensor vulnerabilities, categorize the attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities, and critically assess existing countermeasures and defense mechanisms. Our study provides unique insights into the practical implementation of these countermeasures through simulations and testbeds, which have been underrepresented in prior research. This approach aims to support the development of more robust security solutions for AVs.

16 August 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TOTolulope A. Odetola
Tolulope A. Odetola
FKFaiq Khalid
Faiq Khalid
HMHawzhin Mohammed
Hawzhin Mohammed
TSTravis C. Sandefur
Travis C. Sandefur
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have shown impressive performance in computer vision, natural language processing, and many other applications, but they exhibit high computations and substantial memory requirements. To address these limitations, especially in resource-constrained devices, the use of cloud computing for CNNs is becoming more popular. This comes with privacy and latency concerns that have motivated the designers to develop embedded hardware accelerators for CNNs. However, designing a specialized accelerator increases the time-to-market and cost of production. Therefore, to reduce the time-to-market and access to state-of-the-art techniques, CNN hardware mapping and deployment on embedded accelerators are often outsourced to untrusted third parties, which is going to be more prevalent in futuristic artificial intelligence of things (AIoT) systems. These AIoT systems anticipates horizontal collaboration among different resource constrained AIoT node devices, where CNN layers are partitioned and these devices collaboratively compute complex CNN tasks. This horizontal collaboration opens another attack surface to the CNN-based application, like inserting the hardware Trojans (HT) into the embedded accelerators designed for the CNN. Therefore, there is a dire need to explore this attack surface for designing the secure embedded hardware accelerators for CNNs. Towards this goal, in this paper, we exploited this attack surface to propose an HT-based attack called FeSHI. Since in horizontal collaboration of RC AIoT devices different sections of CNN architectures are outsourced to different untrusted third parties, the attacker may not know the input image, but it has access to the layer-by-layer output feature maps information for the assigned sections of the CNN architecture. This attack exploits the statistical distribution, i.e., Gaussian distribution, of the layer-by-layer feature maps of the CNN to design two triggers for stealthy HT with a very low probability of triggering. Also three different novel, stealthy and effective trigger designs are proposed. To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack, we deployed the LeNet and LeNet-3D on PYNQ to classify the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively, and tested FeSHI. The experimental results show that FeSHI utilizes up to 2% extra LUTs, and the overall resource overhead is less than 1% compared to the original designs. It is also demonstrated on the PYNQ board that FeSHI triggers the attack vary randomly making it extremely difficult to detect.

31 January 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAAdewale A. Adeyemo
Adewale A. Adeyemo
JSJonathan J. Sanderson
Jonathan J. Sanderson
TOTolulope A. Odetola
Tolulope A. Odetola
FKFaiq Khalid
Faiq Khalid
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
With significant potential improvement in device-to-device (D2D) communication due to improved wireless link capacity (e.g., 5G and NextG systems), a collaboration of multiple edge devices (called horizontal collaboration (HC)) is becoming a reality for real-time Edge Intelligence (EI). The distributed nature of HC offers an advantage against traditional adversarial attacks because the adversary does not have access to the entire deep learning architecture (DLA). Due to the involvement of multiple untrusted edge devices in HC environment, the possibility of malicious devices cannot be eliminated. In this paper, we unearth some attacks that are very effective and stealthy even when the attacker has minimal knowledge of the DLA as is the case in HC-based DLA. We are also providing novel filtering methods to mitigate such attacks. Our novel attacks leverage local information available on output feature maps (FMs) of a targeted edge device to modify the regular adversarial attacks (e.g. Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) and Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)). Similarly, a customized convolutional neural network (CNN) based filter is empirically designed, developed, and tested. Four different CNN models (LeNet, CapsuleNet, MiniVGGNet, and VGG16) are used to validate the proposed attacks and defense methodologies. Our three attacks on four different CNN models (with two variations of each attack) show a substantial accuracy drop of 62% on average. The proposed filtering approach is able to mitigate the attack by recovering the actual accuracy back to 75.1% on average. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the security vulnerability of DLA in the HC environment, and all three of our attacks are scalable and agnostic to the partition location within the DLA.

1 October 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
FLF. K. Lodhi
F. K. Lodhi
SHS. R. Hasan
S. R. Hasan
OHOsman Hasan
Osman Hasan
FAFalah Awwad
Falah Awwad
Globalization trends in integrated circuit (IC) design using deep submicron (DSM) technologies are leading to increased vulnerability of IC against malicious intrusions. These malicious intrusions are referred to hardware Trojans. One way to address this threat is to utilize unique electrical signatures of ICs, and any deviation from this signature helps in detecting the potential attack paths. Recently we proposed hybrid macro synchronous micro asynchronous (MSMA) pipeline technique while utilizing, non-conventional, asynchronous circuits to generate timing signature. However, traditionally generating these timing signatures with environmental uncertainties require extensive simulations. It is known to the engineering community that computer simulations have its limitations due to the associated heavy computational requirements. In this paper, as a more accurate alternative, we propose a framework to detect the vulnerable paths in the MSMA pipeline for hardware Trojan detection using formal verification methods. In particular, the paper presents a formal model of the MSMA pipeline and its verification results for both functional and timing properties.

16 January 2023 in Inventions
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HSHaijun Si
Haijun Si
ZZZhicheng Zhang
Zhicheng Zhang
OHOrkhan Huseynov
Orkhan Huseynov
Ismail FidanIsmail Fidan
Ismail Fidan
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
MMMOHAMED MAHMOUD
MOHAMED MAHMOUD
Additive manufacturing (AM), also known as three-dimensional (3D) printing, is the process of building a solid object in a layer-wise manner. Cybersecurity is a prevalent issue that appears more and more frequently as AM becomes popular. This paper focuses on the effect of fan speed on the printing quality and presents a plugin called Fan Speed Attack Detection (FSAD) that predicts and monitors fan speeds throughout the printing process. The goal of the plugin is to prevent cybersecurity attacks, specifically targeting fan speed. Using the proposed FSAD, any fan speed changes during the printing process are evaluated to see whether the printer can sustain the abnormal fan speed change and still maintain good print quality.

1 April 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MAMuneeba Asif
Muneeba Asif
MKMohammad Kumail Kazmi
Mohammad Kumail Kazmi
Mohammad Ashiqur RahmanMohammad Ashiqur Rahman
Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman
SHSyed Rafay Hasan
Syed Rafay Hasan
SHSoamar Homsi
Soamar Homsi
As edge computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) expand, horizontal collaboration (HC) emerges as a distributed data processing solution for resource-constrained devices. In particular, a convolutional neural network (CNN) model can be deployed on multiple IoT devices, allowing distributed inference execution for image recognition while ensuring model and data privacy. Yet, this distributed architecture remains vulnerable to adversaries who want to make subtle alterations that impact the model, even if they lack access to the entire model. Such vulnerabilities can have severe implications for various sectors, including healthcare, military, and autonomous systems. However, security solutions for these vulnerabilities have not been explored. This paper presents a novel framework for Secure Horizontal Edge with Adversarial Threat Handling (SHEATH) to detect adversarial noise and eliminate its effect on CNN inference by recovering the original feature maps. Specifically, SHEATH aims to address vulnerabilities without requiring complete knowledge of the CNN model in HC edge architectures based on sequential partitioning. It ensures data and model integrity, offering security against adversarial noise in diverse HC environments. Our evaluations demonstrate SHEATH’s adaptability and effectiveness across diverse CNN configurations.