Hao Xue

Hao Xue

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Hao Xue

Duke University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2016 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TBTim Baldenius
Tim Baldenius
JGJonathan Glover
Jonathan Glover
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue

29 July 2025 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue
This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; M41.

5 December 2022 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JGJonathan Glover
Jonathan Glover
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue

1 October 2016 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue
The paper investigates strategic interactions between an independent analyst and an affiliated analyst in the context of issuing stock recommendations. Compared to the independent analyst, the affiliated analyst has superior information, but faces a conflict of interest. I show that the independent analyst disciplines the affiliated analyst's biased forecasting behavior. Meanwhile, the independent analyst sometimes herds with the affiliated analyst to improve his recommendation accuracy. Because of the affiliated analyst's conflict of interest, the value the independent analyst expects to derive from his ex post herding option is endogenous and can motivate him to acquire more information up front. As a result, herding and disciplining not only coexist, but also mutually reinforce each other. That is, there is an endogenous complementarity between the independent analyst's ex ante disciplining role and his ex post herding behavior in equilibrium.

28 February 2020 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
JGJonathan C. Glover
Jonathan C. Glover
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue
Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other by facilitating a strategic complementarity in their payoffs. In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure that is a noisy version of the individual non-verifiable measures, and show that the verifiable measure is either ignored or used to create a conditional bonus floor.

1 July 2023 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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SCStephanie F. Cheng
Stephanie F. Cheng
CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue
Ownership segmentation in the municipal bond market gives rise to competition among local issuers for a limited supply of capital. We consider the disclosure implications of this competition for capital, using Moody’s 2010 recalibration of the municipal rating scale. The recalibration placed lowly upgraded issuers at a disadvantage relative to their highly upgraded peers within the same market segment. We develop a model in which two municipal bond issuers compete for investors’ capital by choosing bond yields. The model predicts the issuer that is disadvantaged by the recalibration is more likely to improve its disclosure to better compete with its advantaged peer if (i) the rating upgrade that its peer receives is higher and (ii) competition for capital is fiercer. Empirically, we find that the disadvantaged issuers provide more and timelier financial disclosures after the recalibration. This improvement in disclosure quality increases in the extent of the issuer’s disadvantage, arises only if we consider peers with whom the issuer directly competes for capital, and is pronounced when the local capital supply is constrained. Our analytical and empirical analyses support the idea that a competitive disadvantage in raising capital in segmented markets can motivate issuers to improve disclosure quality. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4525 .