Christine Cuny

Christine Cuny

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Christine Cuny

Stern School of Business New York University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 July 2018 in Review of Accounting Studies
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JBJeffrey J. Burks
Jeffrey J. Burks
CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny
JGJoseph Gerakos
Joseph Gerakos
JGJoão Granja
João Granja

1 August 2016 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
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Journal Article
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CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny

1 February 2018 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
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Journal Article
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CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny

14 May 2020 in Journal of Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny
JKJungbae Kim
Jungbae Kim
MMMihir N. Mehta
Mihir N. Mehta
This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly exogenous declines in the power of congressional representation, we show that the effect is causal. To better understand why connected local governments can reduce stewardship, we study electoral characteristics. Our findings suggest that the increased resources that come with powerful congressional representation allow local‐government officials to reduce stewardship without material adverse effects on their reelection prospects. In sum, we provide evidence of a cost of political connections: they weaken local governments' incentives to act in a socially optimal manner.

25 October 2020 in Journal of Accounting Research
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CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny
OEOmri Even‐Tov
Omri Even‐Tov
EWEdward M. Watts
Edward M. Watts

1 July 2023 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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SCStephanie F. Cheng
Stephanie F. Cheng
CCChristine Cuny
Christine Cuny
HXHao Xue
Hao Xue
Ownership segmentation in the municipal bond market gives rise to competition among local issuers for a limited supply of capital. We consider the disclosure implications of this competition for capital, using Moody’s 2010 recalibration of the municipal rating scale. The recalibration placed lowly upgraded issuers at a disadvantage relative to their highly upgraded peers within the same market segment. We develop a model in which two municipal bond issuers compete for investors’ capital by choosing bond yields. The model predicts the issuer that is disadvantaged by the recalibration is more likely to improve its disclosure to better compete with its advantaged peer if (i) the rating upgrade that its peer receives is higher and (ii) competition for capital is fiercer. Empirically, we find that the disadvantaged issuers provide more and timelier financial disclosures after the recalibration. This improvement in disclosure quality increases in the extent of the issuer’s disadvantage, arises only if we consider peers with whom the issuer directly competes for capital, and is pronounced when the local capital supply is constrained. Our analytical and empirical analyses support the idea that a competitive disadvantage in raising capital in segmented markets can motivate issuers to improve disclosure quality. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4525 .