John R. Robinson

John R. Robinson

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

John R. Robinson

Texas A&M University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 May 2019 in Contemporary Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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MEMatthew Ege
Matthew Ege
JGJennifer L. Glenn
Jennifer L. Glenn
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson

4 February 2016 in Review of Accounting Studies
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Journal Article
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KPKathleen Powers
Kathleen Powers
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson
BSBridget Stomberg
Bridget Stomberg

1 August 2021 in Journal of Accounting and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EBErik L. Beardsley
Erik L. Beardsley
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson
PWPaul A. Wong
Paul A. Wong

21 June 2020 in Review of Accounting Studies
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Journal Article
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TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
YLYijun Li
Yijun Li
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson

26 May 2002 in Clinical Endocrinology
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Journal Article
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VGVictoria L. Green
Victoria L. Green
IRI. Richmond
I. Richmond
SMS. Maguiness
S. Maguiness
JRJ. Robinson
J. Robinson
LHL. Helboe
L. Helboe
SAStephen L Atkin
Stephen L Atkin

3 October 2024 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson
LSLaura T. Starks
Laura T. Starks
When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting. JEL Classifications: J33; M52.