Thomas R. Kubick

Thomas R. Kubick

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Thomas R. Kubick

University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 August 2018 in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JAJohn L. Abernathy
John L. Abernathy
FGFeng Guo
Feng Guo
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
AMAdi Masli
Adi Masli
SUMMARY: We examine whether the readability of financial statement footnotes in the annual report is informative about audit engagement risk. Using various readability measures, we predict and find that firms with less readable footnotes have longer audit report lag, incur higher audit fees, and are more likely to receive a first time modified going concern opinion. We also show that readability of footnotes is associated with a higher likelihood of financial misstatements and future accounting-related litigation. Our results are robust to several measures of readability used in prior literature, as well as different specifications and design choices, revealing that financial statement footnote readability provides incremental information about audit engagement risk that affects auditor-client contracting. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources identified in the paper.

1 July 2019 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
TOThomas Omer
Thomas Omer
ZWZac Wiebe
Zac Wiebe
Companies are adopting executive compensation recoupment (“clawback”) policies to discourage aggressive financial reporting choices. Recent research suggests clawback policies encourage other means of meeting earnings expectations. We suggest that reducing income tax expense is a means of meeting earnings expectations. We find that effective tax rates are lower after clawback adoption due to increased investments in tax planning. We identify three tax planning activities that clawback companies invest in to lower effective tax rates: purchases of auditor-provided tax services, increased connections to other low-tax companies, and use of tax havens. We provide evidence that effective tax rate decreases do not result from use of opportunistic income tax accruals, and that decreases are stronger among companies that adopt robust clawback policies. Additional tests indicate lower tax outcome volatility and longer, more readable tax footnotes following clawback adoption. Our results suggest a positive spillover effect of clawback adoption on corporate tax policy.

21 June 2020 in Review of Accounting Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
YLYijun Li
Yijun Li
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson

1 October 2017 in Accounting Horizons
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FGFeng Guo
Feng Guo
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
AMAdi N.S. Masli
Adi N.S. Masli
SYNOPSIS: Prior research contends that financial misreporting has a spillover effect on the outcomes of peer firms within the same industry through investment decisions, information risk, and shareholder wealth. We predict and confirm a higher level of audit fees for peer firms when serious misreporting by other firms is announced in the industry. We find this effect is limited to peers that exhibit poor internal control quality. In addition, we observe higher audit fees for peers of industry prominent misreporting firms and for peers of firms announcing restatements with larger negative market reactions. Overall, our results suggest that financial misreporting in the industry has a spillover effect on audit fees of non-misreporting peer firms. Data Availability: All data are from public sources identified in the manuscript.

1 May 2023 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
YLYijun Li
Yijun Li
We identify executives who have experienced significant accounting-related adverse events during their careers as a powerful setting to examine the extent to which prior professional experience can influence subsequent financial reporting policies. We find that firms led by senior financial executives who have experienced accounting-related adverse events during their careers exhibit greater unconditional accounting conservatism, a lower likelihood of experiencing future accounting-related adverse events, and less positive abnormal discretionary accruals. This effect tends to be stronger when the experience is more frequent, recent, severe, or proximate. Overall, our results reveal a meaningful relationship between managers’ professional experience and accounting policies. Data Availability: All data used in this study are obtained from publicly available sources. JEL Classifications: G40; M40; M41.

3 October 2024 in The Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TKThomas R. Kubick
Thomas R. Kubick
JRJohn R. Robinson
John R. Robinson
LSLaura T. Starks
Laura T. Starks
When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting. JEL Classifications: J33; M52.