Yin Xu

Yin Xu

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Yin Xu

University of Science and Technology of China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 March 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
Sheng ZhangSheng Zhang
Sheng Zhang
GGGuoju Gao
Guoju Gao
In this paper, we investigate the incentive problem in Spatial Crowdsourcing (SC), where mobile social-aware workers have unknown qualities and can share their answers to tasks via social networks. The objectives are to recruit high-quality workers and maximize all parties’ utilities simultaneously. However, most existing works assume that the qualities of workers are known in advance or cannot take all parties’ utilities into account together, especially having not considered the impact of social networks. Thus, we propose an incentive mechanism based on the multi-armed bandit and three-stage Stackelberg game, called TACT. We first design a greedy arm-pulling scheme to recruit workers, which not only can solve the exploration-exploitation dilemma but also takes workers’ social relations into account. Based on the recruitment results, we further design the utility functions incorporating with social benefits for workers, and model the payment computation problem as a three-stage Stackelberg game among all participants. Next, we derive the optimal strategy group so that each party can maximize its own utility to form a multi-win situation. Moreover, we theoretically prove the unique existence of Stackelberg equilibrium and the worst regret bound. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations on a real trace to corroborate the performance of TACT.

13 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
YZYu Zhu
Yu Zhu
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
Sheng ZhangSheng Zhang
Sheng Zhang
JZJinrui Zhou
Jinrui Zhou
With the explosive spread of smart mobile devices, Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS) has been becoming a promising paradigm, by which a platform can coordinate a group of workers to complete large-scale data collection tasks using their mobile devices. In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism design in MCS systems, taking the freshness of collected data and social benefits into consideration. First, the Age of Information (AoI) metric is introduced to measure the freshness of data. Then, we model the incentive mechanism design with AoI guarantees as an incomplete information two-stage Stackelberg game with multiple constraints. Next, we consider the scenario that all participants share the public utility function parameters of the Stackelberg game. By deriving the optimal remuneration paid by the platform and the optimal data update frequency for each worker, and proving the existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, we propose an AoI-guaranteed Incentive Mechanism (AIM) that enables the platform and all workers to maximize their utilities simultaneously. Furthermore, we extend AIM to a general scenario where each participant has no prior knowledge of the utility function parameters of the game. By resorting to the Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) technique and modeling the two-stage Stackelberg game as a Markov decision process, we propose a DRL-based Incentive Mechanism (DIM) with AoI guarantees, which makes each participant effectively seek its optimal strategy through trial and error. Meanwhile, the system can guarantee that the AoI values of all data uploaded to the platform are not larger than a given threshold. Finally, numerical experiments on real-world traces are conducted to validate the efficacy and efficiency of AIM and DIM.

17 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
HTHaisheng Tan
Haisheng Tan
GGGuoju Gao
Guoju Gao
In this paper, we focus on the privacy preserving mechanism design for crowdsourced Federated Learning (FL), where a requester can outsource its model training task to some workers via an FL platform. A potential way to preserve the privacy of workers' local data is to leverage Differential Privacy (DP) mechanisms on local models. However, most of these studies cannot allow workers to dominate their own privacy protection levels by themselves. Thus, we propose a Personalized Privacy Preserving Mechanism, called P3M, to satisfy the heterogeneous privacy needs of workers, which consists of two parts. The first part includes a personalized privacy budget determination problem. We model it as a two-stage Stackelberg game, derive the personalized privacy budget for each worker and the optimal payment for the requester, and prove that they form a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Second, we design a dynamic perturbation scheme to perturb model parameters. Through the theoretical analysis, we prove that P3M satisfies the desired DP property, and derive the bounds of the variance of average perturbed parameters and the convergence upper bound. This demonstrates that the global model accuracy can be controllable and P3M is endowed with the satisfactory convergence performance. In addition, we extend our problem to the scenario where the total privacy budget of all workers is limited, so as to prevent some workers from setting exorbitant privacy budgets. Under the privacy constraint, we re-determine the personalized privacy budget for each worker. Finally, exhaustive simulations of P3M are conducted based on real-world datasets, and the experimental results corroborate its effectiveness and practicability.

13 December 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
HTHaisheng Tan
Haisheng Tan
An LiuAn Liu
An Liu
GGGuoju Gao
Guoju Gao
ZYZhaoyang Yan
Zhaoyang Yan
Federated learning (FL) is a newly emerging distributed machine learning paradigm, whereby a server can coordinate multiple clients to jointly train a learning model by using their private datasets. Many researches focus on designing incentive mechanisms in FL, but most of them cannot allow that clients flexibly determine privacy budgets by themselves. In this article, we propose a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism (NICE) based on differential privacy (DP) and Stackelberg game for FL systems in industrial Internet of Things. First, we design a flexible privacy-preserving mechanism for NICE, in which clients can add a Laplace noise into the loss function according to a customized privacy budget. Under this mechanism, we design two incentive utility functions for the server and clients. Next, we model the utility optimization problems as a two-stage Stackelberg game by seeing the server as a leader and the clients as followers. Finally, we derive an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium solution for both the stages of the whole game. Based on this solution, NICE can make the server and all clients achieve their maximum utilities simultaneously. In addition, we conduct extensive simulations on real-world datasets to demonstrate the significant performance of the proposed mechanism.

18 September 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
GGGuoju Gao
Guoju Gao
DLDatian Li
Datian Li
TZTongxiao Zhang
Tongxiao Zhang
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables large-scale IoT devices to collaboratively train a shared model while preserving the privacy of local data. To avoid the single-point-of-failure of the conventional parameter server architecture, the study concentrates on the decentralized FL (DFL) paradigm building on the device-to-device communication network. However, existing DFL frameworks encounter challenges related to resource limitations, privacy protection, and data heterogeneity. To overcome these challenges, the study proposes and implements DF $^{2}$ -MPC in industrial IoT, an efficient DFL framework with personalized model pruning and adaptive communication. Specifically, a personalized pruning ratio determination approach is designed by exploiting the model pruning technique. This approach enables all devices to flexibly determine pruning ratios by themselves, thereby achieving both communication savings and privacy protection. Then, this study designs an adaptive neighbor selection scheme, which can enhance model performance and foster model consensus under resource constraints. In addition, the study theoretically proves the convergence performance of DF $^{2}$ -MPC. Finally, extensive simulations on three real-world traces are conducted to corroborate the superiority of DF $^{2}$ -MPC, demonstrating that the method can improve communication efficiency with satisfactory model accuracy and convergence performance.

14 June 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYin Xu
Yin Xu
Mingjun XiaoMingjun Xiao
Mingjun Xiao
An LiuAn Liu
An Liu
JWJie Wu
Jie Wu
Traditional spatial crowdsourcing (SC) systems employ a centralized server platform to provide services for requesters. Such a centralized design requires powerful resource capacity and often cannot accomplish the urgent demands due to the unpredictable network latency. In order to ensure the scalability of systems and the quality of services, we study the distributed SC (DSC), where a diversity of location-relative services provided by various service providers (SPs) can deploy on edge clouds (ECs) with low time latency. Since the edge resources are limited, SPs need to compete for edge resources so as to deploy their desired SC services, and the requested resources must be allocated together to meet the demand of the service. We first design a gated recurrent unit with particle filter (GRUPF) network for SPs to predict future resource demands so as to participate in the competitions judiciously. Then, we model the competitive edge resource allocation problem between SPs and ECs as a combinatorial auction process. Due to the NP-hardness of this problem, an approximation algorithm is proposed to tackle it. Moreover, the leakage of private information such as bids may incur severe economic damage, and most existing studies usually rely on a trusted third party to provide rigorous privacy protection. Therefore, we customize a novel differentially private resource auction (DRA) mechanism, and design a bid confusion strategy based on differential privacy. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that the DRA mechanism meets some desired properties, including $\epsilon $ -differential privacy, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and $\gamma $ -truthfulness. Additionally, we corroborate the significant performances of DRA through extensive simulations on synthetic and real-world data sets.