Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

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Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2005 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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RLRicardo P. C. Leal
Ricardo P. C. Leal
ASAndre Carvalhal da Silva
Andre Carvalhal da Silva
We construct a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available information. Our goal was to measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest possible number of firms without the biases and low response ratios typical of qualitative surveys. CGI levels have improved over time in Brazil. CGI components demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of corporate governance. We find very high concentration levels of voting rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting shares. Control has concentrated between 1998 and 2002. We do not find evidence for either entrenchment or incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages but find that the separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a .38 increase in Tobin's q. This represents a 95% rise in the stock value of a company with the average leverage and Tobin's q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8% rise in the stock price of the average firm in 2002. We found no significant relationship between governance and the dividend payout but there are indications that dividend payments are greater when control and cash flow rights concentration are greater. We place our results in context by offering a comparative analysis with Chile. We would offer a sound "yes" if asked whether good corporate governance practices increase corporate value in Brazil.

1 January 2000 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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SVSilvia Mourthe Valadares
Silvia Mourthe Valadares
RLRicardo P. C. Leal
Ricardo P. C. Leal
The paper analyzes the structure of ownership and control of public Brazilian companies using data from 325 companies listed at the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange. We show a high degree of ownership concentration. The biggest shareholder has, on average, 41% of the equity capital, while the five biggest have 61%. The concentration occurs mainly with voting shares with 62% of the companies having one shareholder with more than 50% of the voting shares. Actually, the violation of the one share-one vote rule with the use of non-voting shares is very common. Only 11% of the companies does not have non voting shares and the companies have, on average, only 54% of their equity capital as voting capital. We also analyze the indirect ownership structure. Pyramiding structure is not commonly used as a way of violating the one share - one vote rule, besides the fact that the control is maintained through more than one tier. We also show the importance of different shareholder classes. Corporations are the main investor category in the direct ownership structure while individuals are more important at the when indirect control is accounted for.

1 January 2006 in Corporate Ownership and Control
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ASAndré Luiz Carvalhal da Silva
André Luiz Carvalhal da Silva
RLRicardo Pereira Câmara Leal
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal
This paper analyzes the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies and the effect of cash flow and voting rights on firm valuation and performance. Ownership is quite concentrated in Brazil with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that non-voting shares and indirect control structures are largely used to concentrate control with reduced overall investment in the company. Our results support the hypothesis that firm valuation and performance are positively related to cash flow concentration, and negatively related to voting concentration and to the separation of voting from cash flow rights. Moreover, firm valuation and performance are relatively higher for firms with controlling shareholders when compared to firms without controlling shareholders.

1 June 2013 in Revista de Administração Contemporânea
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MPMarcos Barbosa Pinto
Marcos Barbosa Pinto
RLRicardo Pereira Câmara Leal
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal
The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.

5 November 2015 in Brazilian Review of Finance
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RLRicardo Pereira Câmara Leal
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal
ACAndré L. Carvalhal
André L. Carvalhal
AIAna Paula Iervolino
Ana Paula Iervolino
Este estudo apresenta a evolução de certas práticas de governança corporativa de empresas brasileiras negociadas em bolsa entre 2004 e 2013 que compõem um índice (CGI). Os resultados indicam que a qualidade dessas práticas melhorou, especialmente após a criação dos níveis diferenciados de negociação de adesão voluntária na bolsa, que exigem práticas melhores de governança corporativa e transparência. O CGI médio de 5,8 (em um total de 10) em 2013 pode ser considerado baixo e sugere que pode haver mais espaço para melhoria. Além disso, as empresas pontuam muito baixo nos aspectos de ética e conflitos de interesse do CGI, quando comparadas com os componentes sobre transparência, composição e funcionamento do conselho e diretos dos acionistas. O número muito pequeno de empresas que proíbem empréstimos a partes relacionadas e que facilitam a participação nas assembleias de acionistas é uma preocupação. A diminuição de mecanismos de aumento do controle, como as ações sem direito de voto e estruturas indiretas de controle, foi um avanço notável. Mesmo assim, os acordos de acionistas são cada vez mais empregados como instrumentos que interferem com a independência dos conselheiros e aumentam o poder do bloco controlador.

20 June 2007 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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ASAlexandre Di Miceli da Silveira
Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira
RLRicardo P. C. Leal
Ricardo P. C. Leal
ASAndre Carvalhal da Silva
Andre Carvalhal da Silva
LBLucas Ayres Barreira de Campos Barros
Lucas Ayres Barreira de Campos Barros
This paper analyzes the evolution and the determinants of firm-level corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 to 2004 using a broad corporate governance index. A key contribution is to examine the voluntary adoption of corporate governance guidelines under an almost "no listing requirements" environment in Brazil over a reasonable time span while most studies use cross-section samples over one or a few years. This is probably one of the few papers to investigate the impact of ownership structure on the quality of corporate governance practices segregating control and cash flow rights. Also, we perform regression analyses employing a robust panel-data GMM-based procedure that accounts for the main sources of endogeneity associated with our empirical design. Our data shows that overall firm-level corporate governance quality is steadily improving but is still low and that heterogeneity has increased during the sample period. Voluntarily joining stricter listing requirements, either by cross-listing in the US or by joining Bovespa's New Market, is positively associated with firm-level corporate governance quality. We found no clear evidence of the influence of other potential determinants, such as growth perspectives, firm size, firm value, and ownership structure, and we doubt the methodological reliability of previous findings suggesting that there is a causal relationship from value and ownership to corporate governance practices.