Sanu K. Mathew

Sanu K. Mathew

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Sanu K. Mathew

Intel Labs, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, OR, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 January 2019 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SSSudhir K. Satpathy
Sudhir K. Satpathy
SMSanu K. Mathew
Sanu K. Mathew
RKRaghavan Kumar
Raghavan Kumar
VSVikram Suresh
Vikram Suresh
MAMark A. Anders
Mark A. Anders
VDVivek De
Vivek De

21 May 2018 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MKMonodeep Kar
Monodeep Kar
ASArvind Singh
Arvind Singh
SMSanu K. Mathew
Sanu K. Mathew
ARAnand Rajan
Anand Rajan
VDVivek De
Vivek De
SMSaibal Mukhopadhyay
Saibal Mukhopadhyay
This paper demonstrates an integrated inductive voltage regulator (IVR) for improving power side-channel-attack (PSCA) resistance of 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128) engines. An inductive IVR is shown to transform the current signatures generated by an encryption engine. Furthermore, an all-digital circuit block, referred to as the loop-randomizer, is introduced to randomize the IVR transformations. A 130-nm test-chip with an inductive IVR with 11.6-nH inductance, 3.2-nF capacitance, and 125-MHz switching frequency is used to drive two different architectures of AES-128 engine: high performance and low power. The measurements demonstrate that the IVR with loop randomizer eliminates information leakage while incurring only 3% overhead in performance and 5% overhead in power over a baseline IVR-AES system. Moreover, while a key-byte can be extracted for the standalone high-performance and low-power AES (LP-AES) with only 5000 and 1000 measurements, respectively, the proposed IVR inhibits key extraction even with 500,000 measurements.

13 November 2018 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASArvind Singh
Arvind Singh
MKMonodeep Kar
Monodeep Kar
SMSanu K. Mathew
Sanu K. Mathew
ARAnand Rajan
Anand Rajan
VDVivek De
Vivek De
SMSaibal Mukhopadhyay
Saibal Mukhopadhyay

24 November 2020 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Debayan DasDebayan Das
Debayan Das
JDJosef Danial
Josef Danial
AGAnupam Golder
Anupam Golder
NMNirmoy Modak
Nirmoy Modak
SMShovan Maity
Shovan Maity
SSShreyas Sen
Shreyas Sen
Mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented on a physical substrate, leak critical “side-channel” information, leading to power and electromagnetic (EM) analysis attacks. Circuit-level protections involve switched capacitor, buck converter, or series low-dropout (LDO) regulator-based implementations, each of which suffers from significant power, area, or performance tradeoffs and has only achieved a minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) of $10M$ till date. Utilizing an in-depth white-box model, this work, for the first time, focuses on signature suppression in the current domain, which provides an $Attenuation^{2}$ enhancement in MTD, leading to orders of magnitude improvement in both power and EM side-channel analysis (SCA) immunities. Using a combination of current-domain “signature attenuation” (CDSA) along with local lower level metal routing, the critical correlated information in the crypto current is significantly suppressed before it reaches the supply pin. Especially, to prevent the EM leakage from its source (metal layers carrying the correlated crypto current acting as antennas), this work embraces lower level metal routing of the CDSA embedding the crypto-IP so that the signature becomes highly suppressed before it passes through the higher metal layers (which radiates significantly) to connect to the external pin. The 65-nm CMOS test chip contains both protected and unprotected parallel AES-256 implementations, running at a clock frequency of 50 MHz. Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) on the protected CDSA-AES, demonstrated with on-chip measurements for the first time, shows that the higher level metal layers leak significantly more compared with the lower level metal routing. Correlational power and EM analysis (CPA/CEMA) attacks on the unprotected implementation were able to extract the secret key within $8k$ and $12k$ traces, respectively, while the protected CDSA-AES could not be broken even after $1B$ encryptions for both power and EM SCA, evaluated both in the time and frequency domains, showing an improvement of $100\times $ over the prior state-of-the-art countermeasures with comparable power and area overheads.

28 October 2019 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASArvind Singh
Arvind Singh
MKMonodeep Kar
Monodeep Kar
VCVenkata Chaitanya Krishna Chekuri
Venkata Chaitanya Krishna Chekuri
SMSanu K. Mathew
Sanu K. Mathew
ARAnand Rajan
Anand Rajan
SMSaibal Mukhopadhyay
Saibal Mukhopadhyay
This article demonstrates enhanced power (P) and electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) attack resistance of standard (unprotected) 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES) engines with parallel (P-AES, 128-bit) and serial (S-AES, 8-bit) datapaths and a 128-bit SIMON engine with the bit-serial (1-bit) datapath by an on-die security-aware all-digital low-dropout (DLDO) regulator. The proposed DLDO improves SCA resistance using control-loop-induced perturbations in a nominal DLDO, enhanced by a random switching noise injector (SNI) by power-stage control and a randomized reference voltage (R-VREF) generator coupled with all-digital clock modulation (ADCM). SCA performed on the measured power/EM signatures acquired from a 130-nm CMOS testchip demonstrates up to 25x reduction in test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) leakage for P-AES and 3579x, 2182x, and 500x increase in minimum-traces-to-disclose (MTD) 80% of the subkeys for P-AES, S-AES, and SIMON cores, respectively, with respect to correlation power analysis (CPA) and correlation EM analysis (CEMA).

8 January 2020 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RKRaghavan Kumar
Raghavan Kumar
VSVikram Suresh
Vikram Suresh
MKMonodeep Kar
Monodeep Kar
SSSudhir Satpathy
Sudhir Satpathy
MAMark A. Anders
Mark A. Anders
SMSanu K. Mathew
Sanu K. Mathew
Cryptographic circuits such as advanced encryption standard (AES) are vulnerable to correlation power analysis (CPA) side-channel attacks (SCAs), where an adversary monitors chip supply current signatures or electromagnetic (EM) emissions to decipher the value of embedded keys. This article describes an all-digital, fully synthesizable SCA-resistant 16-b serial AES-128 hardware accelerator fabricated in 14-nm CMOS, occupying 4900 μm². Randomized byte-order shuffling through heterogeneous Sboxes, linear masked MixColumns, and dual-rail AddRoundKey circuits enable: 1) 9.2x lower correlation between current signatures and hamming distance (HD)/hamming weight (HW) power models compared to an unprotected AES implemented in 14-nm CMOS; 2) 2.3x attenuation of a correlation ratio for correct key guesses; 3) 839-Mb/s encryption throughput with 11-mW total power consumption measured at 750 mV, 25 °C; 4) peak energy efficiency of 390 Gbps/W measured at an energy optimal point of 290 mV, 25 °C, representing an overhead of 23% over the unprotected AES engine; 5) 1200x improvement in minimum-traces-to-disclosure (MTD) over an unprotected AES accelerator, with no successful CPA attacks observed after 12M encryptions; and 7) >1100x improvement in test vector leakage assessment (TVLA ) metric in power and EM time- and frequency-domain analyses.