Lior Fink

Lior Fink

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Lior Fink

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 May 2017 in Precision Agriculture
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Journal Article
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AGAnat Goldstein
Anat Goldstein
LFLior Fink
Lior Fink
AMAmit Meitin
Amit Meitin
SBShiran Bohadana
Shiran Bohadana
OLOscar Lutenberg
Oscar Lutenberg
GRGilad Ravid
Gilad Ravid

1 January 2017 in Information & Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LFLior Fink
Lior Fink
NYNir Yogev
Nir Yogev
AEAdir Even
Adir Even

1 March 2009 in Information & Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
LFLior Fink
Lior Fink
SNSeev Neumann
Seev Neumann

1 November 2017 in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Journal Article
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OROrit Raphaeli
Orit Raphaeli
AGAnat Goldstein
Anat Goldstein
LFLior Fink
Lior Fink

1 January 2011 in European Journal of Information Systems
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Journal Article
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LFLior Fink
Lior Fink
The European Journal of Information Systems provides a distinctive European perspective on the theory and practice of information systems for a global audience. We encourage first rate research articles by academics, but also case studies and reflective articles by practitioners. We provide a critical view on technology, development, implementation, strategy, management and policy.

1 March 2016 in MIS Quarterly
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Journal Article
Closed access
MBMichel Benaroch
Michel Benaroch
YLYossi Lichtenstein
Yossi Lichtenstein
LFLior Fink
Lior Fink
This paper examines multiple contract design choices in the context of transaction and relational attributes and consequent ex ante and ex post transaction costs. It focuses on two understudied themes in the IT outsourcing literature. First, while the literature is predominantly concerned with opportunism and consequent ex post hazard costs that contracts can safeguard against, parties to a contract also economize on ex ante transaction costs by their choice of contract type and contract extensiveness. Second, the literature studies the aggregate extensiveness of contracts rather than of distinct contract functions: safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability. Against this backdrop, our research model portrays a nuanced picture that is anchored in the following theoretical interpretation: transaction and relational attributes have implications on specific ex ante and ex post transaction costs, and these implications can be balanced by respective choices in both contract type and the extensiveness of specific contract functions. These two contract design choices complement and substitute for each other in their ability to economize on specific transaction costs. Our analysis of 210 software development outsourcing contracts finds that explanatory power increases when analyzing the extensiveness of individual contract functions rather than the aggregate contract extensiveness, highlighting subtle competing influences that are otherwise masked by an aggregate measure. Our analysis also shows that a preference for time-and-material contracts counteracts the effect of certain transaction attributes on contract extensiveness, and even cancels it out in the case of transaction uncertainty.